

PEACE

CONFLICT

PEACE & CONFLICT

Addressing corruption threats in international interventions

A framework for policymakers

PEACE

Quote from interviewee. Consectetur
adipiscing elit. In est lectus, condimentum in
posuere a, semper a dolor. Ut auctor ligula id
augue gravida adipiscing. Nulla tincidunt
dolor arcu, non molestie urna. Duis mi nisl,
pretium a tempus in, pellentesque eget
mauris. Sed lobortis tristique urna a porta.

© Cover photo: XXX

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2015. Nevertheless, Chapter name cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.

ISBN: XXX XXX XXX

Printed on 100% recycled paper.

© 2015 Transparency International UK. All rights reserved.

Addressing corruption threats in international interventions

A framework for policy-makers

Executive Summary.....	5
The analysis	5
Proposed framework	8
1. Introduction	10
This report	12
2. Afghanistan	13
2.1 The international community’s involvement in Afghanistan	13
2.2 Corruption in the Afghan context.....	21
3. Methodology.....	30
3.1 The interviewees	30
3.2 The questions	33
3.3 Analysis	35
4. Recognising & addressing corruption threats	39
4.1 Political difficulties and dilemmas	40
4.2 Complacency among international policy makers.....	42
4.3 Perverse spending incentives.....	44
4.4 Limited range of anti-corruption tools.....	46
4.5 Disconnect between research and policy	48
4.6 Host nation counter-moves.....	49
4.7 Weakness of Afghan civil society.....	50

5. The role of international institutions	52
5.1 The UN and UNAMA.....	53
5.2 UNDP	55
5.3 NATO	56
5.4 World Bank.....	57
5.5 The European Union (EU).....	58
5.6 States	59
5.7 Individuals.....	59
6. Building the army, the police and rule of law.....	60
6.1 Training the ANA.....	61
6.2 Building integrity in the ANA.....	63
6.3 Reforming institutional processes in the ANA	63
6.4 Training the police.....	64
6.5 Building integrity in the police	65
6.6 Reforming institutional processes in the police	66
6.7 Rule of law	67
7. A framework for policy makers	69
1. Early consideration of corruption threats	69
2. Equipping policy makers and implementers	71
3. International civilian leadership	75
4. Prudent use of funds.....	78
5. Oversight and transparency	78
Next steps	80
Endnotes	81

Executive Summary

The international community's engagement with Afghanistan since 2001 is replete with lessons on how to become better at dealing with conflict, instability and state development. One of those lessons is the need for a better policy framework for addressing corruption.

Whilst many in the international community recognised the dangers of corruption and were ready to put some anti-corruption measures in place, there was little discussion of the issue at policy level, almost no investment in subject matter experts, and minimal coordinated international counter-corruption effort. This paradox is the principal reason for this study.

Transparency International has been engaged in Afghanistan since 2008, through its UK-based international Defence and Security Programme (TI-UK DSP). The TI-DSP team has worked with the Afghan National Security Forces, with the ISAF coalition force and with Afghan civil society: training military and police officers on corruption prevention, reviewing the effects of corruption in-country, and bringing together different groups on the topic.

Internationally, the serious impact that corruption can have on security is being increasingly recognised. For example: following the Westgate attacks in Kenya in September 2013, John Githongo, former Kenyan Permanent Secretary for Governance, said "Corruption – systemic graft – is at the heart of the state's inability to respond to insecurity in general."

In February 2014 the then-UK Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond told the Munich Security Conference: "Challenging institutional corruption... is not just a moral imperative... it is a practical imperative."¹

U.S. Vice President Biden signalled a change in the U.S. approach in April 2014 when he told Ukrainian leaders that they had to "fight the cancer of corruption" that is weakening their defences.² The U.S. established a 'Security and Governance' initiative in August 2014 with five African countries.³

Everyone recognises that there is no 'one-size-fits-all solution' to tackling the problem of corruption in international interventions. But the current approach, in which corruption is seen as an inevitable and unchangeable part of the context in which the mission must operate, is insufficient. Ignoring the problem leads to corruption and its effects becoming more deeply embedded, increasing the likelihood that the international effort will fail.

The analysis

We explored a framework for international policy makers by conducting in-depth interviews with 75 people who had been closely involved in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. The interviewees were selected based on whether they had been deeply involved in the country, had detailed knowledge of corruption as an issue in Afghanistan, or had been in positions where they were part of policy making or policy implementation throughout the mission. They were largely from the international community, including both civilian and military representatives, and ranged from senior civilian policy makers and military commanders through to those involved at a more operational level. Ten of the interviews were Afghan, ensuring the presence of a national perspective as well as the international one.

The interviews led to over 600 pages of transcript. Analysis of the interviews has yielded detailed insight on the questions of how the international community approached the issue of corruption in a conflict environment and why corruption threats did not gain much institutional traction.

The analysis of the narratives is split into three broad sections: the first section focusses on how the international community (IC) approached corruption threats and risks in Afghanistan, and why it took a long time for a more pro-active approach to develop. The second examines the role played by the major international institutions. The third examines the way in which corruption risks and corruption threats were or were not taken into account in the building of the Afghan army, the police and the rule of law.

Regarding the **lack of a proactive approach by the IC**, we identified eight reasons why the IC was slow to develop a response to the danger from corruption threats and corruption risks: see box.

Interviewees recognised the central importance of **international institutions** in leading the international community in addressing corruption, and the dangers when they failed to do so. They had the following proposals:

- Both, “national” and “international” corruption should be visibly fought. Early evidence of the IC’s intent to limit corruption is necessary.
- Conversely, a lack of early focus on corruption sets the wrong agenda and leads to low expectations of the IC. This also reduces scope for international institutions to show leadership on the topic, foregoing their natural leadership role.
- The great autonomy given to the senior individuals in charge of international missions needs to be balanced by clear policy guidance on the need to address corruption threats.
- Large international support programmes can be well controlled, despite the difficulties. There is some good practice from the World Bank that could be adopted elsewhere in respect of the mechanisms for corruption control of large programmes.
- Corruption threats only start to be seriously thought about by the IC after a sizeable, dedicated group has been formed. An international institution, rather than the military, should initiate this.
- Unified command is essential. Unhealthy competition and imbalances between the civilian and military communities, as well as between various international institutions, severely damages the effectiveness of anti-corruption work.
- International institutions could improve by reviewing and adapting their policies, guidance and practices in relation to corruption threats on international interventions.

1. Lack of attention on corruption issues from the very beginning
2. Political difficulties and dilemmas
3. Complacency among policymakers
4. Perverse spending incentives for funds
5. Limited anti-corruption tools
6. Disconnect between research and policy
7. Host nation counter-moves
8. Weakness of Afghan civil society

Interviewees had a number of proposals for building integrity and reducing corruption risk in the military, police and rule of law institutions:

- Unified international leadership of the training effort.
- More thought on training police in post-conflict countries.
- Including explicit work on transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC) when building military and police forces.
- Starting programmes to train IC trainers on TACC early.
- Resisting the urge among international military trainers to avoid soft but difficult subjects like TACC in favour of hard skills.
- Formulating better international military doctrine, training and exercises to improve understanding of corruption threats on operations.
- Immediately establishing an independent investigative body.
- Starting to work with the judiciary while enlarging specialist crime investigating agencies.

The analysis also highlights several positive initiatives from Afghanistan that can be adapted and used in other countries and other missions. These were:

- A joint national-international committee of experts to monitor and evaluate national progress on anti-corruption initiatives.
- A specialist corruption-prevention support agency for the international community.
- A specialist agency tracking corruption and fraud in international contracting for the mission.
- An independent internal monitoring body for international missions.
- A specialist cell tracking illicit money flows.
- The systematic analysis of the lessons learned about corruption.
- Anti-corruption initiatives with the National Army.

However, despite the relative success of these individual initiatives, it was clear from the interviews that the international community does not yet have a coherent approach to the corruption threats to international support for fragile states. Interviewees - whether civilian, military or police, whether in government, outside government or in international organisations – all stressed the need for a more proactive approach. They stressed that corruption should not be regarded as a 'technical' issue, but a political one that has high public visibility, a sort of 'lightning conductor' for frustration and anger among the population. It is therefore a very public test of the values and standards of the donor countries.

Interviewees recognised that establishing a better IC approach was not an easy task, given the inherent policy dilemmas, the range of complex interconnected issues - from state larceny through to local corruption in daily services – and the fact that the subject cuts across multiple organisational and institutional boundaries.

Proposed framework

We propose a five-point framework for how the international community might improve its handling of corruption threats and corruption risks, consisting of the following elements:

1. Early consideration of corruption threats

- a. Analysis of the issues
- b. Inclusion in the mandate
- c. Calibration of the scale of corruption issue

2. Equipping policy-makers and implementers

- a. Better equipping international policy-makers
- b. Better equipping international military, police and rule of law personnel
- c. Development of the counter-corruption 'toolbox'
- d. Strengthening national military, police and rule of law forces

3. International civilian leadership

- a. Civilian ownership of corruption issues within the mission
- b. A single, agreed policy line on corruption issues
- c. A policy that is robust against sophisticated retaliation

4. Prudent use of funds

- a. Spend less
- b. Cease using spending incentives that encourage corruption
- c. No expenditure without an in-built audit
- d. Coordination of aid projects between donors

5. Oversight and transparency

- a. Strong independent oversight
- b. Transparency at donor level
- c. Transparency at the national level of all defence and security spending
- d. Information and feedback channels

Details of each of the elements are given in the body of the report.

The framework is designed to be used as a checklist against which to measure whether an organisation's current anti-corruption policies and practices add up to a coherent approach. It can also be used each time a state (or international institution) is planning some form of international technical support or intervention.

Next steps

We encourage all those involved in policy-making in relation to international interventions and technical assistance to consider how their own policies and processes align with the guidance from this framework. We welcome debate and discussion that will strengthen the framework.

Thanks

We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to our 75 interviewees, who have taken significant time and effort to give us their candid views on both what went wrong and how to be better in the future. We hope that with this report we have done justice to their common desire to see international mechanisms emerge that can deal better with corruption risks and threats. TI-UK would like to thank the UK Department for International Development (DfID) for their generous support.

1. Introduction

It is hard to read about Afghanistan without finding multiple references to corruption. Afghanistan remains one of the worst-performing countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, ranking bottom in 2013, along with North Korea and Somalia.⁴

Over the period of this study corruption has affected both Afghans and the international community. Huge national corruption scandals such as Kabul Bank,⁵ where \$935m was appropriated, compete for space with articles about provincial and district police chiefs buying their positions for \$100,000. Reports of the U.S. paying warlords for the protection of international convoys - as in the report 'Warlords Inc'⁶ - are set alongside international investigations of corruption by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR.⁷ Corruption has consistently featured as being one of the top three concerns of Afghan citizens in national surveys.⁸ The surveys indicate that the level of concern is still rising in 2014.⁹


Was this inevitable?

The sums of money flowing into Afghanistan have been extremely large. The \$104bn that the U.S. has invested in Afghanistan from 2001 to mid-2014 is greater in inflation-adjusted terms than the Marshall Plan that was designed to rebuild Western Europe after World War Two.¹⁰

In addition to the huge amounts of money involved, the other distinguishing feature of the international effort in Afghanistan is the high proportion of the international effort devoted to reconstructing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). There is no comparable blueprint in the history of international interventions, except perhaps U.S. involvement in South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Similarly, Afghan national spending is heavily skewed towards the police and the military, with the MoD and Mol absorbing more than the next 13 Ministries combined (see chart opposite).¹¹

Afghan Budget Breakdown (SY1390)



This places a huge responsibility on the international community to rebuild the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in a way that is sustainable, with new forces that have had sufficient integrity and capacity training to stand up to the challenges they are bound to face. Without such core capabilities, the ANA and ANP are unlikely to command the respect of a population that has become increasingly critical of corruption. The current situation in Iraq demonstrates the consequences of pouring money into an armed force without sufficient leadership, integrity and anti-corruption training.

The question on many people's minds will be whether, if faced with a comparable insurgency to ISIL in Iraq, the Afghan army would do any better.

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, ranging from 'state capture' through to bribes required for the provision of daily services. It is inherently political and entwined with power and influence. In interventions there is overwhelming pressure to achieve specific goals within tight deadlines

while operating in challenging environments that may require international personnel to work with potentially corrupt actors. Without careful planning such activity can directly contribute to an increase in corruption and insecurity. These dilemmas are central to the comments of many interviewees:

“Our conception of what the state does and how it derives legitimacy... was fundamentally at odds with the ruling political elites and their governing model which was more of a patronage system where you use international resources to support patronage networks of key individuals to keep you in power and keep the support base intact. These were the two very fundamentally contradictory models which were working in Afghanistan... Our resources were more often than not used to support local power brokers, which was then interpreted as corruption and the Afghan public interpreted as corruption”.

International policy maker, 07.12.2012

There will never be a ‘one-size-fits-all solution’ to the problem of corruption in international interventions. But a passive approach in which corruption is seen as simply an inevitable part of the context in which the mission must operate is insufficient and counter-productive. This belief is shared by almost all the Afghans TI-DSP has met in the course of its work, whether civilian or military, government or civil society.

Transparency International

Transparency International (TI) is a civil society organisation leading the global fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information about TI, please visit www.transparency.org.

Since 2004, Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) has actively engaged defence and security ministries, armed forces, police, defence contractors, peacekeepers and civil society to counter corruption in the defence and security sectors. Our emphasis has been on practical measures that reduce corruption risk, each of them trialled in a real-world national environment. Our work is designed to aid policy makers and those engaged with managing defence and security institutions to increase transparency and accountability, recognise the threats posed by corruption, and encourage the development of ‘clean’ establishments.

TI-DSP has been actively engaged with Afghanistan since 2008. We have developed and implemented training courses for senior officers in the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police on corruption prevention. We have been in regular discussion with both ANSF and ISAF personnel on corruption prevention measures, and organised events to this effect. We have twice reviewed how ISAF has developed its corruption prevention activities, and have engaged with Afghan policy-makers and NGOs on how to address the corruption threats. TI-DSP has produced a detailed report on the vulnerabilities of the ANA to corruption.¹²

This report is part of the same series of work as our recent publication: “Corruption threats and interventions: guidance for leaders” (2014) but focusses on the mitigation of corruption risk at a

policy rather than a practitioner level. It also draws on earlier TI-DSP reports on “Corruption as a Threat to Stability and Peace” (2014) and “Corruption and Peacekeeping: Strengthening Peacekeeping and the UN” (2013). Information on Transparency International’s work in the defence and security sector to date, including overviews of current and past projects, and publications, is available at the TI-UK Defence and Security Programme’s website: www.ti-defence.org.

This report

We have examined why there was limited effort by the international community to address the corruption threats to the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan. We carried out detailed interviews with 75 people who have been involved with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. To the maximum extent possible, these are individuals we know to have good knowledge of the corruption issues in Afghanistan, and to have made serious contributions in their respective fields.

The resulting report is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, we outline the political context of the last 13 years and the nature of corruption in Afghanistan in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we present the methodology for this study with information on the interviewees, interview questions and our different levels of analysis. The analysis section, comprising the following three chapters, contains the body of analysis of our interviewees’ responses. Chapter 4 covers the broad approach of the IC to corruption threats in Afghanistan and the various reasons why it was slow to respond to them. Chapter 5 reviews the role played within the international community by the major international institutions. Chapter 6 examines the institutions of the army, the police and the rule of law. Finally, Chapter 7 contains proposals for a framework to assist policymakers in addressing corruption threats in future interventions and technical assistance missions.

2. Afghanistan

2.1 The international community's involvement in Afghanistan

Post-9/11, international engagement in Afghanistan was quantitatively and qualitatively different from anything that had gone before. Between 2001 and 2014 the U.S. alone spent \$104 billion in aid and reconstruction funds - more than it had given in aid to any country throughout its history and more than it spent on rebuilding Europe (after adjusting for inflation) through the Marshall Plan.¹³ The military commitment was also extremely large: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop numbers peaked at approximately 132,000 in mid-2011, with 90,000 of them American.¹⁴ But the results of the International Community's involvement are still disputed. As a senior policy advisor warned, *"if Afghanistan fails the test of independence, and the Taliban come back, part of that narrative will be a little bit like what was said about South Vietnam in 1975, this remained a hopeless, corrupt, client state, that had just not built the legitimacy, or the sustainability that will populate support to survive on its own"*.¹⁵ The governance and security situation in Afghanistan leaves much to be desired – proof of the maxim that there can never be a purely military solution to an insurgency.



Figure 1: ISAF forces in Afghanistan (source: Khama Press <http://www.khaama.com/the-significance-and-achievements-of-isaf-mission-in-afghanistan-8137>)

Corruption underlies many of Afghanistan's problems; indeed some would say that corruption currently underpins the government and the political economy of the country. It comes close to what the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described as 'systemic corruption', i.e. *'not as a failure or distortion of government but [...] a functioning system in which ruling networks use selected levers of power to capture specific revenue streams.'*¹⁶ Corruption pervades the system of political appointments, hampers legitimate economic development and shifts economic activity into areas such as drug trafficking. As a senior Afghan interviewee told

us, *“corruption has become a big political factor. If you remove corruption from the Afghan government, it would collapse. Corruption is sustaining the network”*.¹⁷ Another senior Afghan stated that *“corruption has mattered a lot as a political factor. It has allowed people to come into the power structure. All key government positions were given through corruption mechanisms. This has affected the political development processes in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan there is a political-economic mafia in control of all resources, the economy and power”*.¹⁸

International success in Afghanistan depends on the existence of a stable and effective government. But does corruption impair stability and effectiveness? Corruption is often seen as subsidiary to ideological drivers of insurgency - one of our interviewees noted that *“there are no instances where a person would kill themselves because of corruption”*.¹⁹ But most interviewees²⁰ countered that an insecure environment enables corrupt networks to function better and sustain instability, and vice-versa. Corruption also has connections with insecurity in the region more generally. Illicit drug trade networks reach deep into neighbouring countries, allowing powerful players to gain influence by supporting Afghan factions and perpetuating the insurgency.²¹ It is therefore clear that corruption has acted as a severe impediment to efforts to stabilise Afghanistan.

However, the problem is not limited to the Afghan side: there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that international interventions can unintentionally aggravate and entrench corruption. Without an in-depth understanding of the political system and the role that corruption plays in it, it is easy for things to go wrong.²² As XX said, *“There is a link, and certainly a major link, between corruption and people’s unhappiness with the government... Although most of the Western governments thought they had provided security, in my view and in the view of many others they have been providing insecurity by making people afraid”*.²³

“Afghans say: ‘you muddy the water so you can fish’. Politicians create insecurity to enrich themselves. The international community on the other hand, on the wrong assumptions, think aid and security go together: that by increasing aid you will get more security, which is a completely misunderstood assumption... The more money that flows into those areas, the more insecure they become”.²⁴

If corruption is overlooked early it becomes much harder to correct later. International engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 followed a decade of relative disengagement after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The country had descended into a chaotic civil war among rival warlords and subsequently into progressively more severe Taliban rule. Some states, particularly Afghanistan's neighbours and Saudi Arabia, supported one or other of the warring sides; the United States ordered intermittent air strikes on Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and protested the Taliban treatment of women springing from its extreme interpretation of Sharia law.

The United Nations, which had facilitated the 1988 Geneva Accords setting up the terms of the Soviet withdrawal, had a three-pronged strategy. The first was humanitarian relief, delivered through the UN's Special Mission to Afghanistan. Another was an attempt to end the civil war through the mediation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with the engagement of Afghanistan's neighbours and other stakeholders. The Security Council also imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime as they took control of more and more territory. Sanctions, as Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged in 2001, failed to stop the Taliban from consolidating power; but, as XX asserts, at least '*forced people to think twice before recognising the Taliban as the de facto power of Afghanistan*'.²⁵ Sanctions also did nothing for the wider issue of development and governance. But these were not the priorities: the international community was understandably focussed on brokering a ceasefire and a general political settlement. However in early 2001, Vendrell's Geneva Initiative proposed directing economic aid in a way that would build up an alternative political structure in Afghanistan and Kofi Annan recommended a 'comprehensive approach' to Afghanistan's problems.²⁶

Understandably, the picture changed radically after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The immediate priority was simply to neutralise Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. After the fall of the Taliban the election of a democratic government meant that building the authority of that government with international support became a key objective. There was much talk about economic development and support for democratic institutions, although underlying this was the need to prevent the use of ungoverned space for terrorist activities. Despite significant development and reconstruction programmes; governance and rule of law issues (including tackling corruption) received relatively little attention until 2009-2010. Interviewees agreed that while corruption seriously undermined the effectiveness of Afghanistan's government and the life of the average Afghan, for the international community the immediate military security agenda trumped the anti-corruption agenda. This did not change until Barack Obama took over from George W. Bush as U.S. President:²⁷ "*After the change in U.S. administration to Obama, corruption was perceived as an important political factor. For the Bush administration, security was a bigger problem. With Obama, corruption became more politicised, especially related to Karzai's government.*"²⁸

The objectives of the international intervention also, inevitably, evolved over time: "*Several transformations of military intervention [were seen] between 2001 and today. Initial objectives were in response to the Taliban's refusal to hand over Bin Laden... Once regime change took place and counter terror and stability operations came into play, they were permanent 2002 to 2008. International military contribution was significant. In 2008 it became clear that more attention had to be paid to corruption. In 2009 it was clear that corruption in Afghanistan was a fatal threat to ISAF's mission. In the summer 2010 we started anti-corruption taskforces, designed to focus on our military contribution to the corruption problem.*"²⁹

Following the December 2001 Bonn Conference, which set up a political framework for a transitional Afghan government, there were five distinct phases of international involvement.

During **Phase 1** — 2002-2003—Afghanistan saw two distinct strands of involvement. One was the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), launched in October 2001 in response to the Taliban’s refusal to turn over Osama bin Laden, which had primarily counter-terrorist goals. Its mandate did not prioritise stabilising and reconstructing Afghanistan or tackling issues such as corruption and the rule of law. The U.S. did invite allies to establish Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), small civil-military teams with a focus on reconstruction, but their context was counter-terrorism. It was, one interviewee suggested, a “war on the cheap”,³⁰ conducted in the shadow of the impending intervention in Iraq: *“So the U.S. essentially takes over patronage of the Northern Alliance from India, Iran and Russia. We provide the money with bribes and weaponry... we’re wedded to the illegitimate actors, which are the warlords that lost their legitimacy with the fall of Najibullah government in 1992. So for four years they go about destroying Afghanistan as they fight each other, their behaviour results in the rise of the Taliban who’ve come in to get rid of the corruption brought about by these characters. But now the characters that were corrupt are the characters we base our whole policy on because the Bonn conference [was] only a conference of the victors and not the losers.... The Bush administration is already planning the attack on Iraq in the fall of 2001. So [there’s] a desire to keep everything nice and easy, and the warlords are rebranded as the Afghan National Security Forces.”*³¹

OEF worked with regional warlords to secure their cooperation in the hunt for Al Qaeda. Reconstruction projects were assessed in terms of their usefulness for counter-terrorism. *“The toppling of Taliban regime was done through a combination of large amounts of CIA distributed money and special forces teams. This is where ‘corruption’ or ‘money flow’ and military power aligned brilliantly. Between 2001 and the expansion of NATO... the regions of the country were basically run by warlords who were kept in patronage positions. That set up the parameters for the U.S. and NATO intervention.”*³²

This strategy entrenched the dominance of warlords and gave less priority to reconstruction and governance issues. This view was common across both IC and Afghan interviewees, as exemplified by this international policy implementer: *“Lakhtar Brahimi at the UN and Mr Khalilzad made huge mistakes. At time of intervention in Afghanistan we invited the criminals to the table of negotiation at Bonn. Part of the government was Jihadi, behind trafficking of drugs and humans, they were part of the first government of Karzai and we supported this government.”*³³

Afghanistan’s governance structure, first transitional and then officially confirmed by the January 2004 constitution, contributed to solidification of the warlords’ influence. The combination of a strong president; less significant Parliament and regional representation; and overall weakness of the Afghan state, forced Hamid Karzai to rely on regional warlords e.g. for the collection of taxes and customs revenue.

During this phase, reconstruction, governance and development activities largely fell to the UN. It established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), responsible for some aid and

Phase 1: 2001 – 2003

- U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom begins (removal of Taliban regime) (2001)
- Bonn Agreement (established an Interim Authority for six months and set out roles of an UN-mandated force in securing Kabul and training Afghan security forces) (2001)
- International Security Assistance Force established (2002)
- Tokyo Donor Conference (US \$4.5 billion in aid pledged over the next five years. Most aid funds used for short-term humanitarian relief) (2002)
- Emergency Loya-Jirga (Hamid Karzai confirmed as transitional leader) (2002)

reconstruction projects, shepherding a more permanent political settlement, demobilising regional militia and collecting their weapons, and for the initial steps involved in setting up the Afghan army and police force as mandated by the 2002 Geneva agreement with donors.³⁴ The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 also mandated the establishment of an international force to maintain peace in and around Kabul. The International Security Assistance Force stood up in January 2002.



Figure 2: UNAMA map of high risk areas in Afghanistan (source: Frontline <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/rebuilding.html>)

Phase 2: 2003 – 2005

- Expansion of ISAF (NATO takes over ISAF, ISAF takes over a German-lead PRT in Kunduz) (2003)
- New constitution adopted following the 2003 Constitutional Jirga – presidential system of government (2004)
- Berlin Donor Conference (2004)
- ISAF takes over Regional Command North (2004)
- Elections (Hamid Karzai elected in presidential elections) (2004)
- National assembly and provincial council elections (2005)
- ISAF expansion taking over Regional Command West (2005)

During **Phase 2** of the engagement - December 2003 to October 2006 - ISAF was taken over by NATO and – with UN authorisation – began to expand across the country, with a four-stage process completed in October 2006.³⁵ This was accompanied by a reduction in the size of OEF and the transfer of some of its activities to ISAF.

ISAF's overall task was assisting the Afghan government in creating a secure environment, including developing and training the Afghan National Security Forces, providing support for civilian-military reconstruction projects, speeding up the disarmament of armed groups and supporting humanitarian assistance operations. The mission's expansion was accompanied by

the adoption of the Afghanistan Compact, a successor to the Bonn Agreement, in February 2006. The Compact, while pledging more assistance, set out expectations for the Afghan government: tackling corruption through a set of measurable improvements to governance was one of those expectations. Corruption was also recognised as a contributory factor to the narcotics trade and its eradication seen as one way to diminish the influence of narco-invested warlords. But while the Compact recognised the importance of corruption, in practice the follow-through was limited.

The Taliban-led insurgency, which erupted in the south and the east in the summer of 2006, dominated **Phase 3** (October 2006–December 2009). The focus moved away from governance towards counter-insurgency and security. The imbalance between the military and civilian elements of the international presence —including the relative weakness of UNAMA when

compared with ISAF—exacerbated the problem: *“The civilian element to the mission in my time [late 2007, early 2008] was a miniscule component of the setup.”*³⁶ and *“the intervention was a military-led process with a civilian side following the military.”*³⁷ *“The intervention was very much driven by security aspects, insurgency-driven, with very little emphasis on state-building or peace-building. The priority for the Americans and the Western Allies has been Al-Qaeda, Taliban, insurgency, and not so much the population itself. The intervention was very much driven by the military.”*³⁸

In 2008 Congress appointed the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to oversee the spending of aid money and the delivery of reconstruction projects. But the importance of corruption as an issue in these new circumstances was not recognised by the international community until **Phase 4** (December 2009–September 2012). One interviewee told us: *“In 2010 I had a conversation: ‘Well we’re just getting started, we haven’t done anything on corruption in the last couple of years.’ There was a big shift when ISAF made the shift to a counter-insurgency approach.”*³⁹

Phase 3: 2006 – 2009

- Afghanistan compact (poverty reduction and aid effectiveness. Commitments made to improve aid effectiveness. ‘Principles of cooperation’ is to ‘combat corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability’.
- Afghan government agrees to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption by the end of 2006 and to implement ‘measurable improvements’ in tackling corruption. A ‘zero-tolerance’ policy for official corruption is incorporated into the counter-narcotics plan (2006)
- ISAF taking over Regional Command South and Regional Command East (2006)
- 2006 Insurgency (Insurgency starts in the south and east, drawing attention away from governance issues)
- Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS established the strategy which is organized under three pillars: i. security, ii. Governance, rule of law and human rights, and iii. Economic and social development (2008)
- Paris Declaration (2008)
- Anti-corruption Agency (High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption as mandated of oversight function) (2008)
- SIGAR (US Congress established independent oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction and development projects) (2008)
- Barack Obama elected president (2008)
- The Hague Conference Declaration (2009)

Phase 4: 2009 - 2012

- US surge, 33,000 additional troops deployed to the south and east (2009)
- London Conference (a phased transition to an Afghan lead on security operations to begin late 2010. Increase in international forces announced. (2010)
- Kabul Conference (security handover - Afghan forces to lead security operations by 2014. At least 50% of aid to be channelled through the government of Afghanistan) (2010)
- 'Warlord, Inc.' Report – report details the diversion of US funds to fund Taliban activities and draws attention to corruption issues (2010)
- Task Force Shafafiyat established (ISAF) (2010)
- Independent Joint Anti-corruption and Monitoring and Evaluation Committee monitors and evaluates national and international anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan (2011)
- Bonn Conference II (2011)
- End of US surge (2012)

Phase 5: 2012- 2014

- Drawdown

The shift to a 'population-centric' counter-insurgency approach put a premium on reducing civilian casualties and on 'winning hearts and minds' through better governance and improvements in basic services. General David Petraeus and General Stanley McChrystal, both ISAF commanders, recognised that the achievement of the mission's counter-insurgency goals depended on fighting corruption, which Afghans identified as the most important factor in people's support for the Taliban over the Karzai government. Fighting corruption, XX told us, was '*a moral imperative, and it's an operational imperative*'.⁴⁰

The influx of funds into the country following the surge of U.S. military and civilian personnel also contributed to the recognition of corruption as a serious issue: "*Things changed in the 3rd stage, post-General McChrystal... Because it was a surge [before], they didn't have long to get things done, and didn't have time to wait for Afghan government institutions to build themselves. When you step forward, you take the host nation government out of the loop. The ground work was laid before 2009, but in 2009 corruption suddenly became an issue because there was so much money.*"⁴¹

In 2010, the House of Representatives' report 'Warlord, Inc.' drew attention to the consequences of corruption, showing that a substantial percentage of U.S. aid money had found its way to insurgent groups. In 2010, ISAF's task force, Shafafiyat (Transparency), started work mapping corruption networks and providing anti-corruption knowledge and support for ISAF personnel.

In 2012, as the intervention entered **Phase 5** (September 2012-December 2014), troop numbers began to fall and the handover to Afghan security forces began.

International donors met at a conference in Tokyo. Alongside further aid pledges, they agreed to the

Afghanistan Mutual Accountability Framework ('[TMAF](#)'). The Framework stated that 'business as usual' was no longer an option and set out measurable objectives for the Afghan government to achieve. One of them was the creation and enforcement of 'the legal framework for fighting corruption including, for example, annual asset declarations of senior public officials including the executive, legislative and judiciary.'⁴² Nevertheless, progress in eradicating corruption has at best been mixed: in 2013, DfID Permanent Secretary Mark Lowcock stated that more needed to be done.⁴³ "*As NATO troops move towards withdrawal in 2014, they have become less concerned about corruption.*"⁴⁴

2.2 Corruption in the Afghan context

The concept of corruption is broadly similar around the world and is generally understood. However, the term itself is contextual: different nations, cultures and groups place different meanings on 'corruption.' Transparency International's widely accepted definition is 'the abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for illegitimate (private or group) gain'.⁴⁵

We explored how our interviewees articulated the issues of corruption in Afghanistan starting with the intervention in 2001. We also wanted to understand how corruption was interpreted in the Afghan context, including whether there was a difference in perceptions of corruption between members of the international community and the local population, and how concepts such as patronage and factionalism fit into the corruption landscape in Afghanistan.

We also asked some specific questions as to whether efforts to tackle corruption had varied between provinces and what the rationale for a differentiated approach would be, followed by a discussion of the scale of corruption in Afghanistan.

Corruption in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day

When asked to identify how corruption manifested itself throughout the Afghanistan mission, interviewees described an evolving set of issues, starting with the moment international troops and funds entered the country:

- Many interviewees insisted that Afghans tend to think of corruption as a relatively new problem for their country. As one Afghan interviewee put it: *"20 years ago corruption was a shame among Afghans. If you were corrupt, your life was hell because people would stop talking to you. And now that's completely changed. A new culture has risen: if you're not corrupt, people think you're stupid"*.⁴⁶
- Early decisions during the intervention were considered as sending a strongly permissive signal both to the elite and the general population about corruption. Notably, the way that the 2002 Loya Jirga (grand assembly) was run was denounced as *"throwing money... at corrupt and predatory local actors"*.⁴⁷ This was compounded when no steps were taken to rein in the warlords as their power and influence grew. *"Boundaries were not put on predatory action by strongmen."*⁴⁸
- Also in the early years of the intervention, corruption problems manifested at an operational level as some of the early inflows of funds had almost no controls on them. As one interviewee recounts: *"Much of the corruption was introduced by some elements of the very poorly planned aid response and the flood of unaccountable money through multiple channels."*⁴⁹
- As money flows increased, both local and international individuals and institutions quickly profited. Short time frames and the drive for results by the IC meant that there were very strong incentives not to prioritise corruption-reducing measures, which would inevitably slow down the spending rate. This climate of perverse spending incentives and opaque deals was reported as *"not cynicism, [but] a fundamental reality"*.⁵⁰
- Despite some better mechanisms being introduced, for example the World Bank's 'dual key mechanism', there was a steep decline in the effort devoted to countering corruption between 2005 and 2008. In 2008 the then NATO Secretary General said that corruption was important, but *"to the extent that it is not linked to military activities."*⁵¹

- From 2008 onwards the Afghan government was increasingly criticised for a perceived lack of interest in improving governance and the delivery of services. Key anti-corruption agencies – the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) and the Attorney General's office - were widely seen as ineffective and corrupt, and yet were still protected by the president.
- Awareness of corruption threats and their direct influence on insecurity rose around 2009, in parallel with the dramatic surge in resources entering the country. By this time corruption was one of the top three concerns to Afghans, along with insecurity and employment.

VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF CORRUPTION




FIGURE 3

Understanding corruption in Afghanistan

Talking about corruption in the Afghan context raised a number of specific questions surrounding how corruption is understood in different social, cultural and political contexts. This included unpicking distinctions between different levels of corruption, as well as exploring the link between ethnic tensions, factionalism and the unfair accumulation of resources.

Interviewees tended to agree that “Afghans are not a different species of human being”⁵² with a wildly different understanding of corruption to the rest of the world. Nevertheless they did highlight a number of specific Afghan interpretations of the country’s significant corruption problems:

- **Patronage, nepotism and criminal networks:** Interviewees recounted how, in strong family-dominated societies, some degree of nepotism is accepted as being entirely normal and even desired: you are expected to look after your extended family. However, large-scale nepotism is recognised as a different issue and is not accepted as a legitimate form of governance. As one senior policymaker from the UN put it: *“Because we are dealing with a very weak state, and a very strong personal network, once the personal networks come in contact with a state structure, they start to dominate and redefine that state structure. You can take any minister, any police chief in Afghanistan and the way that he functions, or the way that his office is run is that it’s run on the backbone of his personal network.”*⁵³

Nepotism within government institutions is rife, as reflected by one interviewee: *“I would say at appointment level - those in the sensitive positions - they are mostly if not all linked to some factions or some personalities of the country who are extremely corrupt. They’re not faithful to the government but to their own Jihadi factions or their own political groups. It’s all a matter of appointment at the administrative level... They progressively facilitated the interests of the Taliban in the region. They were giving everything to the Taliban... Then with that the Taliban became much stronger. That’s how the Taliban increased their power there. And that’s the level of corruption. And these people were not nice people: they were involved in all kind of trafficking.”*⁵⁴

- **Corruption in contracting:** In addition to a certain degree of accepted corruption in appointments procedure when it involves family ties, some interviewees reported that a certain system of reward for the giving of contracts was also not uncommon. As one interviewee recounted: *“In this country contractors have to give 5% of the value of the contract to the person who gives the contract to them. It’s part of the culture, a kind of thank you for the contract... I only had problems talking with contractors – they tried to pressure me into giving them 5% more money, because they had to pay the 5% to the director of department, or to pay for terrorists – Taliban - for security reasons, driving to Kabul, bringing materials and equipment from Kabul, or paying for terrorists because they were afraid of security... I usually got this request. According to our regulations, after signing the contract I couldn’t pay more money. I said ‘you have to do this contract according to this money. If you need additional money I will break up this contract and I will get new contractors.’ After these discussions they usually didn’t ask again”*⁵⁵
- **Daily services:** Interviewees described Afghans as being well aware of the corruption issues. As one pointed out, Afghans have over 15 words for corruption in Dari and Pashtu. There is routine acceptance of ‘run of the mill’ corruption in the bureaucracy of daily activities. But, again, interviewees recognised that Afghans differentiate between that –even though they don’t like it – and more egregious forms of corruption. As one senior policy implementer put it: *“I’ll give you an example, when I was in Kunduz, people*

tried to get passports and it cost a large amount of money. I tried to take this up with the police and governors, and talk to people. I tried to talk to people in meetings, open it up in debate, but nobody wanted to talk about this. And the people didn't want to talk because they just wanted to pay and get their passport rather than get no passport.”⁵⁶

- **Corruption as incompetence:** There are some examples given by interviewees that suggest that Afghans consider managerial incompetence or ineptitude as corruption. In contrast, it took the international community some years to recognise that having multiple sub-contractors for one contract, to the point where only 5-10% of the original contract value is actually delivered on the ground, should really be considered at best as bad practice and at worst as a form of corruption, even though the sub-contracting itself is entirely legal.
- **Factionalism, ethnic divisions and corruption:** Interviewees had a common narrative on links between factionalism and corruption, noting that different ethnic groupings are part of the power structure of Afghan society. Similarly, organised crime groups – and Criminal Patronage Networks – tend to be ethnically based, so there appears to be an ethnic division, when in fact the overriding problem is one of elite factionalism.

This distinction came across in several interviews, with one interviewee commenting that Afghan society could effectively be divided into “*the grassroots, the mid-level, and also the top level—as soon as you go down to the level of citizens, the majority of the population, you will see less ethnic tension and as soon as you go upward, you will find more ethnic tension among those leaders.*”⁵⁷

In June 2014, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (an Afghan NGO) issued their latest national corruption survey. It found that corruption tied for second as the greatest challenge facing Afghanistan, after security. While 18% of respondents in the 2012 survey said that they had faced corruption within the last 12 months, this rose to 21% in the 2014 survey. The survey also noted that Afghans believe that corruption in most public sectors undermined their access to services. For example, 28% of respondents believed that their households were deprived of access to electricity because of corruption and 18% said corruption blocked their access to higher education. These are services which the U.S. has invested billions into developing and which are commonly referred to as success stories of international aid.

International dimensions of corruption in Afghanistan

The narrative surrounding corruption in the Afghan context has, in some cases, become highly politicised. Several interviewees commented on the way that the Afghan government, notably President Karzai, intentionally chose to define corruption as a problem brought into Afghanistan by foreigners. This opinion has since carried a lot of weight in terms of local perceptions of the intervention, in no small part because of the president's influence over the media. This plays into the view, held by many, that there was much less corruption in the past, and certainly much less before the Russian invasion.

The tendency to adopt a one-sided narrative about the sources of corruption is also evident in Western narratives that blame corruption on the Afghans. Both sides fail to acknowledge the dual internal-external nature of corruption threats to missions, which can arise as a function of

both local conditions and the impact of international actors. Many interviewees also recognised the **international dimensions** of corruption in Afghanistan:

- **Donor funds:** More aid equals more corruption. As one of the Afghan interviewees said: *“It must be well known (in the international community) how aid leads to more corruption: there will have been knowledge from earlier interventions. Thus the international community should have flagged it much earlier, and connected all funding to proper conditionality and much tighter oversight of disbursement”*.⁵⁸ Additionally, there was a huge disparity in the size of international and Afghan resources, which was picked up on as one senior policy maker as fuelling corruption: *“the two most visible features were the weakness of government in Afghanistan - its almost zero domestic tax revenue base and total dependence therefore on aid - and the institutional weakness reflected in that... [there was one of] the greatest asymmetries between national capacity and international support that I’d ever seen and therefore in itself you know, if you’re looking for causes of corruption”*.⁵⁹
- **Stability choices:** Equally, interviewees were well aware of the compromises being made by the international community. For example: *“Tolerance of significant corruption seems to be a better alternative than a sort of provocation of local power structures from the point of view of stabilisation. One reads that this is again and again the decision that alliance commanders and possibly PRT heads have had to accept and had a devils bargain. It’s a kind of glue, but with its own toxicity and is a kind of solvent of other things”*.⁶⁰

Another notes how there was a lack of long-term vision for Afghan stability among contributing countries, meaning that compromises on ethical standards became common in pursuit of short-term stabilisation: *“State-building wasn’t the idea, it was a war on terror... In 2002, the Americans put more resources towards building the Afghan state, and then were planning to withdraw progressively from 04/05. They couldn’t invest more resources, so they had to rely on patronage.”*⁶¹

The following was given as a typical example: *“A senior Afghan general was in charge of one of the airports of the country. He was claiming he had 5000 staff on his books, but actually only had about 3000... In order for security in that region to be maintained, the NATO regional commander put up with that situation. The consequence was that NATO was seen to be working with a corrupt general.”*⁶²

- **Choosing not to see the corruption:** As one experienced military officer put it: *“I think what’s happened is the Americans, we’ve done a see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil when it comes to corruption because it’s our largess that allows corruption to occur.”*⁶³ Similarly, from a police adviser: *“You make the best of the situation. The next guy coming, when things are stable, you can deal with it. In Kandahar it was worse. You saw the governors and their houses and villas, and thought wow. But you had to deal with it. He’s the governor. We have to wait for the next guy, because if you deal with it, it will break out all over the place.”*⁶⁴
- **Fraud and waste in international contracting:** International attention turned to corruption in defence and security only relatively recently and it has tended to focus on international contracting behaviour. For example, according to the Commission on Wartime Contracting *“at least \$31 billion, and possible as much as \$60 billion”*⁶⁵ of U.S. funds were lost as a result of contracting waste and fraud in Afghanistan and Iraq between financial years 2002 and 2011.

Differences between provinces

Interviewees pointed to some differences in approach to corruption between provinces, and identified three main factors why “every province was completely different. Every province was on its own, almost a separate world, somewhere similar, but really challenging to each commander in its own way, because of its geography, the human geography, everything like that.”⁶⁶

- The nature and longevity of the Afghan leadership in the province
- The variations in available rents between the provinces. For example: customs revenues are only attributable in provinces with borders; mineral resources are only exploited in the north-eastern provinces; and high land value is largely restricted to Kabul.
- The nature of the different international community nations and national commanders in the province. Some were seen as being tolerant of corruption: for example in order to ensure a lower level of violence or fewer attacks on their national troops. Some were seen as disinterested in governance or anti-corruption, whilst others were seen to put great store by trying to develop good governance.




Figure 3: Major combat units by country and region (source: BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7228649.stm)

The scale of corruption

The levels of corruption in the country are extreme, as noted by many of the interviewees, including several who are very experienced in international interventions in conflict environments. For example, XX, stated:

“Corruption in Afghanistan is the worst... It is not limited in the level of people taking part in it; it is not limited in the amounts. It is everywhere and everybody is involved in it”.

He went on to say: *“it also seems that accepting bribes is understood as being the right of public officials, who really do get offended if they don't get bribes. It is extremely difficult and corruption has become part of the modern culture of Afghanistan”.*⁶⁷

Year	Score (out of 10)	Rank
2007	1.8	172/179
2008	1.5	176/180
2009	1.3	179/180
2010	1.4	176/178
2011	1.5	180/192
2012	0.8	174/174
2013	0.8	175/177

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. Afghanistan has consistently scored in the lower ranks of the CPI, showing that it is perceived to be highly corrupt relative to the other countries included in the index. In both 2012 and 2013 it received the lowest ranking of all countries included in the index.




Figure 4: CPI results in 2013. The darker the red, the lower the score (source: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>)

3. Methodology

3.1 The interviewees

Seventy-five detailed interviews were conducted over the period of mid-2012 to mid-2014. The interviewees were chosen because they were deeply involved with Afghanistan for various durations throughout the mission, and could provide a valuable insight into the corruption discourse in Afghanistan. They were chosen to represent a cross-section of actors, and to include experts in policy, diplomacy, the military and police. They include people who we believe are the most knowledgeable in the international community on the issues around corruption and the way that corruption issues played out in Afghanistan.

The interviewees comprised 65 members of the international community and 10 Afghan nationals. Analysis of the different perspectives of this range of individuals allows for a nuanced and comprehensive examination of corruption in Afghanistan.

Interviewees had the choice of being named as an interviewee or remaining anonymous. Many chose to be anonymous, usually because they expressed their views candidly in order to best inform this analysis, and did not want to embarrass their previous or current organisations. Some interviewees were happy to be identified by name as having been interviewed, but did not wish that specific quotes be attributed to them.

The list of interviewees is shown below.

In most cases, verbatim comments that we quote from interviewees are identified by the type of role that they played (see below), not by name. In a few cases, with the permission of the interviewee, we have identified the author of a quote by name where we feel that the identity of the interviewee is critical to the weight that might be given to the quote.

Roles and nationality

Interviewees were divided into six broad categories based on their roles in relation to Afghanistan:

33% Policy makers: These included politicians, senior development officers, senior diplomats, journalists, and military advisers. The category includes officials from UNAMA, UNDP, NATO, the EU, World Bank, and national agencies such as USAID or DfID. This category also includes several former senior military officers.

21% Military: These included all other military officers and military advisors, working for NATO and various national militaries. Most commonly, they hold the rank of Colonel

17% Policy implementers: These included senior development officers, military commanders and consultants. They also worked for aid agencies, UNAMA, UNDP and Shafafiyat.


14.5% Academics/Think-tanks/NGOs: These included Afghanistan subject-matter experts, publishers, researchers, journalists and university lecturers.

10.5% Police: These included police advisers, inspectors, and trainers, working for EUPOL, NATO, and the UK MOD.

4% Senior military: Military officers at the rank of General Officer (Brigadier General up to full General).

The split of the 75 interviewees is shown by the percentages above. Just over half were policy makers or policy implementers. About one third was military or military advisers. Some interviewees could have spanned numerous categories, but were categorised based on their role in Afghanistan and the type of insight they offered into the corruption discourse.


The division of nationalities according to the roles that they had in relation to Afghanistan is shown in the figure to the right:



Time-period of involvement in Afghanistan

Because the corruption issues changed over time, we have identified different time periods within the overall timeframe of 2001 to 2014. Starting with the December 2001 Bonn Conference, which set up a political framework for a transitional Afghan government, there were five distinct phases of international involvement as presented in Chapter 2.

The diagram to the right shows a breakdown of the timeline, and the number of interviewees actively engaged with Afghanistan during those periods. The five broad time periods correspond to the main political periods discussed in Chapter 2. The split of interviewees by time frame is as follows:



3.2 The questions

The semi-structured interviews were based on a question set which used about 30 questions; interviewees were encouraged to give broad responses. Each interview lasted typically one hour, with a range between 30 minutes and 2 hours. A full transcript or detailed notes were made of each interview, which was sent to the interviewee for possible amendments or comments.

Some questions were omitted, depending on the role and expertise of the interviewee.

The question set covered four broad topics:

1. Afghanistan, the political context, and corruption
2. Corruption threats and risks in Afghanistan, and reasons for the slow uptake of the subject by the international community
3. The role played by international institutions, states, and individuals
4. The building of the military, the police, and the rule of law

Guideline Question Set for Interviews

1. Afghanistan, the political context, and corruption

- How has corruption mattered as a political factor over the last 11 years?
- Is there a relationship between corruption and security, or insecurity, in Afghanistan? If so, how does it work?
- In your view, how did regional dynamics with bordering countries affect tackling corruption, and what lessons can be learned for future operations?
- Could you provide us with your overview of the international intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 in terms of the military intervention and addressing corruption?
- How has it mattered as a factor in political and military evolution of the last 11 years? Is there a difference in corruption before and after the international intervention?
- What is your overview of the corruption situation in Afghanistan since 2001?
- Do you think Afghans view corruption the same way as the international community?
- Do you think ethnic divisions play a significant role in levels of corruption?
- How have efforts to tackle corruption varied between provinces? What has been the effect and why?
- What is your view of the nature of corruption in Afghanistan?
- What do you see as having been the main political initiatives in respect of corruption since 2001? Nationally? Through the international community?

2. Corruption threats and risks in Afghanistan, and reasons for the slow uptake of the subject by the international community

- Why did the international community take so long to recognise corruption as a major obstacle to progress in Afghanistan?
- How well do you think the international community has understood and considered governance and corruption in Afghanistan?
- In your view, what are the lessons Afghans (and others) can learn from the last 11 years in order to move forward?

3. The roles played by international institutions, by states, and individuals

- Who has been particularly good or bad: states i) U.S. – military, state, ii) USAID; iii) UK – DOD, FCO, DfD; EU; vii) Germany; Canada; Netherlands, etc.). How has the U.S. viewed corruption in Afghanistan? Has it gone through different phases since 2001?
- Who has been particularly good or bad: The World Bank and the UN (UNODC, UNAMA, UNDP)
- In your view, how could NATO, ISAF and the international community have done better, especially in tackling corruption?
- Have there been particular international leaders who have raised the role of tackling corruption? Who? To what effect?
- Have there been particular Afghan leaders who have raised the role of tackling corruption since 2001? To what effect?
- What has been the approach of President Karzai in relation to corruption?
- How has the U.S. viewed corruption in Afghanistan? Has it gone through different phases since 2001?
- How have Afghan strategies – politicians, civil service, military, police – changed to address corruption since 2001?

4. The building of the military, the police, and the rule of law

- What is your view of corruption levels and relevance in respect of the Afghan police and the MOI, and how, if at all, has it been countered? Please amplify.
- What is your view of corruption levels and relevance in respect of the Afghan military and the MOD, and how, if at all, has it been countered? Please amplify.
- Which military procedures (e.g. doctrine, training, mentoring, monitoring, civ-mil, etc.) have changed in relation to addressing corruption?
- Which police procedures (e.g. doctrine, training, mentoring, monitoring, civ-mil, etc.) have changed in relation to addressing corruption?
- How have the coalition's military, strategic and tactical approaches (if any) to countering corruption since 2001 changed and what have been the effects?
- In your view, how could the national Afghan military and police have done better, especially in tackling corruption?

3.3 Analysis

A detailed analysis was conducted by TI-DSP for each of the four sections shown above. For each section, all of the interviewee responses to the relevant questions were collated, and the TI-DSP team then organised the results into key themes.

In order to limit any subjectivity in the way in which the material has been summarised, the transcripts were analysed in an additional three ways:

- i. First, a material sample of the transcripts, 20-25 interviewees, was reviewed by two people who are very familiar with the work of the international community in Afghanistan, but who had not been interviewed for this study. The two were Sir Stewart Eldon, senior UK diplomat and formerly UK Permanent Representative at NATO 2006-2010; and Sir Ian Andrews, former Second Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence 2002-2008 and former Chairman of the UK Senior Organised Crime Agency 2009-2013.
- ii. Second, another material sample of the transcripts was reviewed by two people who know the Afghanistan environment intimately. Both are members of the Afghanistan Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), and both were themselves interviewees for this study. One is an Afghan MEC committee member (Yama Torabi: formerly the Executive Director of Integrity Watch International, the main anti-corruption NGO in Afghanistan). The second is an expatriate MEC Committee member (Drago Kos; currently Chair of the OECD Working Group on bribery).
- iii. The transcript was analysed using textual analysis software to statistically identify trends, themes and associations. These results were then compared to the themes brought out in the qualitative analysis. This third stage of analysis is described below.

Topic modelling the transcripts

The transcripts were put through textual analysis software in order to provide a check on the qualitative analysis. By identifying all repeated phrases and connections, without the subjective filter of an analyst, the team could check that it was avoiding subjective bias and ensure that strong arguments in just a few transcripts did not dominate the overall analysis.

At first the interview transcripts were coded for the period the interviewees were in Afghanistan and then analysed using MALLETT, a modelling algorithm that draws together topics based on clusters of words that occur frequently together. This uses a form of conditional sampling called the Gibbs procedure, which considers each word in the corpus and generates a probability of it being assigned to a category. The output consists of topic modelling charts, which show the distribution of topics across the different professions, as well as topic stream that shows the topics discussed on the basis of when the interviewees were based in Afghanistan.

These outputs provided an opportunity to check our assumptions about the different interpretations of corruption risk among those involved in Afghanistan against the themes that came out of this statistical analysis.

Eleven core topic areas came out of this analysis, with perceptible differences in the predominant topics discussed by our interviewees based on their own professional background. These are shown in the table opposite.

Topics that came out of the textual analysis process:

1. **Warlords, Taliban, Karzai and power:** This was the most discussed topic in our corpus, and is also the one that remains the most stable in terms of the extent to which different professional classes of interviewee talk about it. Engagement with warlords in Afghanistan, as well the dominant role of Karzai throughout the intervention, come out very strongly. A preoccupation with the Taliban is also understandably evident. Power is a thread that runs throughout this topic, coming up in connection with all of these actors.
2. **Insecurity and lack of strategy:** The second most dominant topic running through the interviewee transcripts is that of insecurity and lack of strategy. Insurgency, stability, cooperation and coordination are core themes of this topic, and are predominantly discussed by interviewees from a military background. That said, policy makers, implementers and academics also show a strong interest in this topic, with only interviewees from a police background falling behind in the amount of times they mention this theme.
3. **Establishing institutions:** Supporting the establishment of institutions such as procurement and services is another core topic that can be pulled out of the corpus. Our police interviewees show the most marked interest in these concerns, followed by policy implementers.
4. **Donors and funds:** Monitoring, funding and donor programmes were a consistently strong theme in our transcripts. Only lower-ranking military personnel did not dedicate as much time to these issues, with all other professional categories contributing strongly to this discussion.
5. **Western support:** Western support in terms of providing defence capacity, rather than the money discussed under donors and funds, was a theme that the military discussed particularly often. Although this theme is present across all of our professional categories, it is worth noting that all others give predominance to the question of financial support over technical assistance.
6. **Accountability and transparency:** Being both accountable and transparent in dealings with society was a central theme across all professional categories, although it is strikingly dominant among high-ranking military personnel.
7. **Resource flows:** Resource flows is another theme that runs throughout our transcripts regardless of professional background. It is, however, particularly strong in transcripts from interviewees with a police background.
8. **Local capacity and spending:** Local capacity and spending is a central theme across policy, military and academic interviewees, although it does drop from a position of prominence among police personnel. Despite this, it is worth noting that themes such as local context, perceptions and perspectives come through very strongly in this topic, showing a preoccupation among our interviewees with assessing their impact.
9. **Networks and sanctions:** Sanctioning certain networks within Afghanistan is a particularly strong topic among lower-ranking military personnel. While policy makers and implementers do also spend time discussing these tactics, police and high-ranking military personnel do not show great interest in this topic.
10. **Capacity, contracts and budgets:** Capacity, contracts and budget oversight is a significant, albeit weaker than the above topics, theme in our corpus. Policy implementers spend the most time talking about this, although it is far from dominating discussion even in this category. It is, however, a topic that is discussed across the professional spectrum.
11. **Anti-corruption, crime and enforcement:** Anti-corruption, crime and enforcement is a strong theme in police and low-ranking military circles, although it is far less evident among other professions.

Analysis

4. Recognising & addressing corruption threats

Summary

In respect to the principal questions – how to recognise and address corruption threats, and why the IC was slow to respond to them in Afghanistan – the interviewees had the following proposals for improvement:

- Be clearer in the objectives of the mission.
- Be restrained in providing support to nefarious actors.
- When supporting nefarious actors, ensure that controls are tightened over time.
- Do research on corruption behaviour early and pay attention to what it says.
- Insist on unified command and control.
- Change organisational incentives/benchmarks away from spending targets.
- Spend less.
- Pay more attention to corruption from the very beginning.
- Do not let the anti-corruption agenda be deferred.
- Pay earlier attention to rule of law issues.
- Invest early to strengthen civil society.

They noted two good practices from Afghanistan to adopt elsewhere: one in relation to a dedicated anti-corruption task force, and one in relation to joint national-international, independent oversight of progress on anti-corruption.

This first analysis focusses specifically on the insights that interviewees gave into how the international community understood and considered governance and corruption in Afghanistan. Almost all interviewees gave detailed and thoughtful responses to this question, many of which should serve as a good basis for future military and civilian planners.

We then asked interviewees to consider why the IC was slow to develop a response to the danger from corruption threats and corruption risks throughout the mission. We found eight broad categories of reason, and have structured interviewees' views on both topics under these headings:

1. Political difficulties and dilemmas
2. Complacency among policy makers
3. Perverse spending incentives for funds
4. Limited anti-corruption tools
5. Disconnect between research and policy

6. Host nation counter-moves
7. Weakness of Afghan civil society

A few interviewees commented that it was unfair to judge the mission on attitudes to corruption from the very beginning in 2002, as in the early years there was very little focus on corruption as an issue by the international community. However, the majority of interviewees indicated that the underlying conditions for corruption had actually been established in those early years; the lack of attention to the issue at this stage set up many of the problems for the future.⁶⁸

4.1 Political difficulties and dilemmas

Interviewees said that one of the most striking problems facing the IC was how to untangle the emerging dilemma over who to engage with on the ground in Afghanistan. They identified a real tension between the desire to stabilise the environment by co-opting existing power brokers and the risk of compromising other objectives by openly dealing with actors seen as being corrupt.

For many interviewees, corruption had been built into the start of the relationship between the IC and Afghanistan. This was primarily through the way the early Loya Jirga settlement had been handled, but also because of the free hand given to actors to do deals with powerful warlords without a serious effort to restrain their power later. These awkward partnerships meant that there was a reluctance to open up the question of corruption later in the mission, as it would have meant investigating many of those whom the IC were supporting. Eventually these deals contributed to the difficulties of state-building in Afghanistan, as in practice the IC had allowed the consolidation of territorial power by a group of Afghan warlords because they were seen as essential allies who could 'get things done'. As one interviewee put it: *"Looking at the 10 years as a whole, [it was] a lost opportunity with strategic mistakes made early on"*.⁶⁹

This dilemma was articulated across the board, with an international policy maker observing that *"politicians on both sides will usually defer the anti-corruption agenda as not as important as other political agendas. At the beginning of the intervention they will generally say 'not now because we need these people as cooperative partners.' At the end they will say 'not now because we need these people as cooperative partners in the exit.' In the middle they will say 'not now because we need their cooperation to carry out our on-going agenda and requirements'"*.⁷⁰

Importantly, this dilemma was reportedly not appreciated fully at the policy level. This is illustrated by XX, one of the IC's most experienced experts on Afghanistan: *"we were doing a lot of research at the sub-national level and highlighting the fact that support for predatory local leaders and bringing back the warlords was really damaging perceptions of the government. So there was awareness amongst analysts fairly early on: but there is very little tolerance at the senior international level for bad news because Afghanistan was the good war and Iraq was the bad war"*.⁷¹

Raising corruption as an issue was mentioned as being politically very difficult. The will to see the mission demonstrating progress was described as very strong, with a real sense that *"Afghanistan was meant to be a success story, particularly after Iraq turned out to be a disaster... governments prefer to receive good news. One of the chronic diseases of diplomats is to be optimistic all the time"*.⁷² This had the consequence that people who did try and raise the issue receiving *"closed doors"*.⁷³ Similarly, the military were described as being constantly optimistic about progress, giving policy makers a reason to not listen to concerns about

corruption. As one senior diplomat put it: *“On the military side, they are always optimistic, they were always getting close to defeating the enemy”*.⁷⁴

The political climate of not discussing the problems being created by corruption meant that by the time that corruption had risen up the political agenda, the political discussion was already turning to drawdown. The wider appetite for adopting active measures on a complex subject like corruption quickly declined. As one journalist put it: *“I think that anti-corruption was dead in the water from 2010... Shafafiyat was set up; but [its] mandate was effectively over before [it] got there... So [although] 2010 was actually the height of anti-corruption in Afghanistan it was [already] over”*.⁷⁵

A related problem was the lack of unified command and control across different lead organizations, civilian and military. *“I think you need unified command and control for the mission; political and military so you can take action quickly. There is no guarantee that that will work against corruption because it would depend on the views of the people at the top when it is centralised. But when decentralised you can be pretty sure it will decline into major corruption because of the way it is controlled, nobody can do anything about corruption. So I would say multinational interventions, unless somebody finds a way to organise them better, don't really work in war. They are ineffective on various fronts, but including in regard to corruption”*.⁷⁶

“Whenever you are compromising
with criminals, you have to
sacrifice laws, regulations and, of
course, resources”.⁷⁷

4.2 Complacency among international policy makers

The political difficulty surrounding raising corruption as an issue was exacerbated by a widespread feeling that corruption was an ‘inevitable’ part of life in Afghanistan. XX spoke of the problem as follows: *“I think the IC was passive about it [corruption] and largely ignorant about the scope of the problem... its impact on the mission, the Afghan state and the Afghan people. And it was this lack of understanding that drove, I think, complacency about the problem and drove this simplistic interpretation of corruption that is really bigotry masquerading as cultural sensitivity: this idea that Afghans are corrupt and there’s nothing we can do about it”*.⁷⁸

This attitude fed into a lack of ownership of the corruption problem as efforts to combat corruption risk were seen as a “*transfer cost*”,⁷⁹ that was superfluous to the success of the mission itself. As one senior policy maker noted: *“I do remember these news stories about logistics contracts and actually what I think that precipitated was the idea that it sort of did not matter that all kinds of warlords and human rights abusers and all kinds of bad actors were getting money through corruption”*.⁸⁰

The problem of complacency was seen as most acute at the senior levels of the IC. One military officer in Shafafiyat expressed their frustration that “within the international community there are probably a decent amount of people who understand how governance works... [however] once you get into higher strategic staff... the chances that they really understand corruption and governance is minimal”.⁸¹ XX went one step further, stating that the “*head of the UN silenced all the talk about corruption*”.⁸² The fact that high-level staff did not seem to engage with corruption as a risk was cited by several other interviewees as a leadership problem that allowed corruption to remain at a secondary level that fell outside of the mandate of senior planners.

As XX emphasised: *“You fall into a pattern of higher ranking officials saying ‘yeah, I get the problem. I get the problem; I get how complex it is, go for it.’ But the larger problem is they’re expected to say that, so they say it... But in reality they don’t [get it]”*.⁸³ The fact that high-level staff did not treat corruption as a risk that they needed to mitigate was particularly significant because the structure of the international mission left a lot of discretion to leaders of the individual international institutions to direct the overall strategy. One senior policy-maker gave the following example: *“the problem with the UN political missions is that far too much power has been decentralised to the SRSGs [Special Representatives of the Secretary General]. His personality and interest thus dictate the organisation’s agenda”*.⁸⁴

According to one interviewee, a senior policy-maker, the fact that the international leadership were frequently disengaged from the problems posed by corruption was exacerbated by the lack of culturally sensitive nations in the coalition. Commenting on the national composition of the international mission, he noted that while at times the IC woke up to the nature of the challenges – *“without a culturally sensitive and significant partner in there, we could never achieve the functioning governance [system] that was necessary to deal with the endemic corruption and the necessary corruption that allowed the country to function”*.⁸⁵ This inability to connect with the Afghan environment is put forward as one of the reasons why there was a broad lack of senior understanding across the IC of how corruption risks affected the mission.

The underlying problem for many interviewees was one of will and engagement. As an Afghan policy maker recounted: *“They always put this as a capacity problem, but the real issue is political will. For years they weren’t saying anything about political will. The discourse about a lack of political will is very new. You couldn’t discuss, contest the fact that there’s no political will—so you focus on capacity”*.⁸⁶ This reluctance to dedicate significant time to countering

corruption risks to the stabilisation effort was characterised by one interviewee as being symptomatic of a wider feeling of complacency among international actors when it came to the Afghanistan mission: *“I do remember people saying to me in Whitehall, is that this war is not quite big enough to dominate the government in the way Iraq did, and yet it’s not small enough to be left somewhere down the line to deal with. And so I always felt it was this orphan war, which just didn’t get the serious grip or attention that it needed”*.⁸⁷

“I hate to use the word naivety, but it came across as a significant problem of naivety where the idea of conditionality just never came into serious consideration... To me conditionality of aid and assistance is everything from a diplomatic viewpoint when you are talking about countering corruption”.⁸⁸

4.3 Perverse spending incentives for international community funds

Many interviewees commented how the speed and scale of the disbursement of funds was prioritised over the achievement of concrete project goals. This observation fed into a wider concern that *“the only way currently to demonstrate that [something] is a priority is by budgeting more money for it – that is how you show its importance in our political systems”*,⁸⁹ allowing the desire to be seen to be doing something to override many other concerns, including those surrounding accountability and corruption.

Many interviewees commented that the only real way to stop swamping a state’s ability to absorb funds is to spend less: in particular, to spend less on large projects. A senior military officer recounted how *“the campaign that they designed is one that is so intrusive and comprehensive and dominant in terms of putting forces on the ground that you are going plough the country with billions and billions of dollars So the strategy you adopt is one of flooding cash into the country”*.⁹⁰ This approach meant that monitoring and evaluation, two key tools for reducing corruption risk, were not prioritised and large sums of money exchanged hands in what was already an extremely unstable and factionalised environment.

An Afghan interviewee emphasised this point, stating that *“the worst national donors are the big ones... None of them have anti-corruption monitoring systems nor any interest in pursuing allegations”*.⁹¹ While this was not a universal criticism, with the Danes and Norwegians picked out by some interviewees as being far more engaged in anti-corruption measures than many of their counterparts,⁹² the overriding conclusion was that *“the disproportionate amount of money being spent in Afghanistan became part of the problem. That would be one of the lessons – spend less and I think there is for one the economic realities in Europe and the West to guarantee that we will be spending less”*.⁹³

These perverse spending incentives are discussed by many interviewees as a strategic error on the part of the mission planners, and one that started right at the beginning of the mission. XX recounted how, at the beginning of the mission, *“the heads of the UN agencies on the ground were given 10 days to write \$2.7 billion worth of projects. It was really scandalous... There was justification in some areas to move quickly – like return of refugees, but a lot of them were things like building schools and hospitals”*.⁹⁴

Instead of contributing to a broader interpretation of stabilisation than the high-level officials discussed in the previous section, one of the most interesting observations that interviewees offered about aid agencies was that their funding streams were dependent on their adoption of a narrative of hard security benefits. As one respondent put it: *“for development actors their livelihoods... depended on the assumption that what they were doing was in their national security interest... The development budget of say USAID was as big as it was because of the assumption on security. Many of the development actors did not want to question that their programmes were having stabilising effects and were less tolerant of the idea that they were having destabilising effects than the military”*.⁹⁵

“Military guys didn’t know how to work, so they just pushed out the money—‘quick impact projects’. A lot of money was just given to elders around the bases in order to create a buffer zone between the bases and potential spoilers”.⁹⁶

4.4 Limited range of anti-corruption tools

For senior officials and planners who did feel that there was a need to address the corruption risks to the mission, their failure to implement successful programmes was largely attributed to a lack of available options.

This fed into a reported concern that the mandate of the mission itself did not lend itself to addressing corruption threats. In the words of one interviewee: *"It would have been much easier if the UN mandate, at least in the early years, had been similar to that for the Kosovo operation. NATO/ ISAF were always very clear that they were not there to govern".*⁹⁷ There was also evidence that the multinational nature of the mission stymied the synchronisation that would have been needed to deliver a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. As XX put it: *"I think coordination of the international community is very weak because none of us probably want to be coordinated by the other... I don't think there is a clear leader on anti-corruption".*⁹⁸

As well as the multinational nature of the mission creating challenges, the complexities of balancing roles on a mission that involved both military and civilian staff was cited as preventing coordinated action from being taken to tackle corruption: *"The military could contribute resources and they had skills in the area but they couldn't possibly do it all. Nor could they work effectively with the aid community without some sort of translation mechanism".*⁹⁹ On the civilian side, there was recognition that *"we deliberately didn't look at corruption in the broader sense. We went at what the American military calls CPNs (criminal patronage networks) and so we were deliberately going in at the hard end".*¹⁰⁰ This meant that there were very limited tools aimed at tackling corruption, and programmes that were in place like the 'High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption Control (HOOAC) and the 'Major Crimes Task Force' (MCTF) were described as deeply flawed.

An Afghan interviewee described the situation as the following: *"Day to day, week by week and month by month, the ordinary people were always complaining about the performance... especially the judiciary section. And that is why, if there is no political will, no one thinks about this problem. The HOOAC and the MEC and other independent entities were established; but none of them worked".*¹⁰¹ The failure of big pieces of the IC state-building anti-corruption toolkit like HOOAC discouraged further action, allowing corruption risks to proliferate unchecked.

Other potential tools did perform relatively well - such as the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which was one of the major IC funding vehicles. Many praised the fact that *"it wasn't straight budget support – it was a way of reimbursing what had been spent. They had to assure the World Bank and demonstrate receipts for spending in order to receive the money".*¹⁰² It had a 'dual key' mechanism to control spending, based on an approach first used in the intervention in Liberia in the 1990s.

However, others pointed out that the fund had never been designed to mitigate corruption risks, so despite the proactive approach taken to monitor spending its auditing mechanisms were relatively weak, with no physical evidence required to validate spending claims. As one interviewee recounted: *"I nearly fell out of my chair when someone told me that their [the ARTF] auditing mechanism was 'Not designed to detect fraud.' Basically, say for example, they get the receipt from the ministry of education and give the money for the cost for the chairs. I asked if anyone actually goes to the school to see if the chairs exist and they said no. I understand that there are some security concerns, but there are ways to work with local authorities and local NGOs to verify these things. That money could be used for anything".*¹⁰³

Whilst both HOOAC and the Attorney General's office were widely seen as corrupt by both Afghans and the IC, interviewees spoke more positively about two other anti-corruption oversight mechanisms introduced by the international community: The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (the MEC), and the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR got off to a slow and shaky start, but in due course became very active in tracking waste and corruption in U.S. contracts. Whilst SIGAR was often a thorn in the side of the U.S. administration, it was widely seen as strengthening the credibility of the U.S. to spend money without corruption or waste. More information is available here: <http://www.sigar.mil>. The 'MEC' is an external corruption monitoring body comprising six respected individuals: three Afghans and three from the international community. They are supported by a sizeable secretariat. They produce external reports of progress against corruption commitments across the whole of the Afghan government. More information can be found here: <http://www.mec.af>.

“What kind of development programme is available that we have on the shelf that will let us deal with the issue of corruption?...I didn't see a lot of tools looking into the bag there, that were labelled anti-corruption programme A, B and C”.¹⁰⁴

4.5 Disconnect between research and policy

Many interviewees remarked that whilst the IC's behaviour during the period between 2001 and 2005 sowed the seeds of corruption, the issue remained off the radar and there was next to no analysis of the corruption threats, notably the links between corruption and insecurity.

The deteriorating security situation after 2005 allowed other narratives to emerge about the roots of instability and the idea that corruption was feeding the insurgency led to research on the links. One experienced observer of Afghanistan and the intervention commented that: *"After 2005, when security started to more noticeably deteriorate and the insurgency more noticeably appeared to gather steam... the security factors started to lead to more questioning as to what is driving this insecurity. By 2007-08 [there was a] more widespread recognition that bad governance (and corruption was an important part of that) was a driver of conflict. But the IC systems take time to absorb that sort of analysis By 2009-10 there was lots more recognition as we started to focus more on the population-centric COIN strategy of the negative effects of corruption"*.¹⁰⁵

By 2010, *"a clear analysis and recognition [among the military] of how corruption, and more than that impunity, was fuelling the insurgency and was the threat to the survival of the state"*¹⁰⁶ led to the establishment by the military of a dedicated task force to analyse corruption and propose how ISAF should be addressing it. The task force was given the name 'Shafafiyat' which means 'transparency' in Dari. It comprised some 60 staff, both civilian and military, all members of the IC with no Afghan participants. This change of direction, initiated by General McChrystal and supported by General Petraeus, turned the attitude among the military until that point of *"see no evil hear no evil"*¹⁰⁷ on its head.

Shafafiyat was given a broad remit to understand the corruption threats in a more fundamental way than anyone had done up until then. Its first head, General HR McMaster, explained how they went about their task: *"We asked: what is the nature of corruption and organised crime? What is its effect on the Afghan state and the mission? And then we built the organisation around that and focussed our effort on where we saw the most severe threats with the objective to reduce corruption and organised crime so that it was no longer fatal to the Afghan state. We felt we deepened our understanding every day in each of these areas. But we took three months to frame it properly. There was a lot we didn't know and had to learn. But I think we were right in our overall definition of the problem: there was a connection with a criminal underworld and a political upper world, and a political settlement that rested in large measure on criminality and impunity"*.¹⁰⁸

Their early work led to the concept of 'Criminal Patronage Networks' within which there is a constant flow of money upwards through the hierarchy and a flow of protective patronage downwards.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, not all of our interviewees were familiar with Shafafiyat, with one Polish military officer admitting: *"I don't know about their activities"*.¹¹⁰ This is an indication that, although a step in the right direction, Shafafiyat was not a silver bullet solution to the problem of adopting a comprehensive anti-corruption approach within the Afghanistan mission.

4.6 Host nation counter-moves

One of the the greatest tension in interventions is the fact that the IC is present at the invitation of the host nation, yet in reality elements of the host nation leadership are likely to be invested in corruption, patronage and criminal activity and therefore will likely be resistant to some of the IC's actions.

“Our conception of what the state does and how it derives legitimacy... was fundamentally at odds with the ruling political elites and their governing model which was more of a patronage system where you use international resources to support patronage networks of key individuals to keep you in power and keep the support base intact.”

International policy maker, 07.12.2012

Inevitably, measures by the IC to limit the diversion of funds or patronage invited counter-measures. Interviewees talked a lot about this:

- “The Afghan government was incredibly effective in deploying counter-moves.”¹¹¹
- “The counter moves were incredibly sophisticated by the Afghan government, including the development of high office of oversight [HOOAC] which became a whole spider web trapping a lot of international community focus because it was like - let's help Afghan institutions with this. Let's pour money, time and energy into this office... which was obviously completely under the Karzai thumb... [This] was never going to be an effective corruption fighting institution.”¹¹²
- “[Karzai's] approach is one of counter attacking – asking ‘can I see some proof please?’ This is sometimes difficult.”¹¹³
- “Karzai could always could pull out the argument, which he is pulling out much more right now, which is that you [should] look at your own practices which are fuelling corruption.”¹¹⁴
- “We should be careful on this. There is one definition of the corruption that's coming from the government, especially from the president Karzai's side. He is defining corruption in Afghanistan as a problem brought by the foreigners.”¹¹⁵
- “I don't think the government has a real interest in fighting corruption. It's a real cat and mouse game.”¹¹⁶

This led to a realisation within ISAF that directing all of its information gathering and intelligence activities towards the insurgents was at least partially wrong. “The major changes in military intelligence-gathering initiated by MGN Flynn in 2011 were a good example of this. He really was one of key players in this project of understanding things like governance ... they started to target and understand people were ostensibly on their side but who they now viewed as malign actors.”

XX, made a similar point: “I would really foster the ability to identify the subversive campaigns of criminal networks, narcotics trafficking organisations and insurgencies”¹¹⁷

4.7 Weakness of Afghan civil society

The initial weakness of Afghan civil society has also been linked to the reason why the international community was slow in recognising and addressing the corruption threats. The core logic of supporting civil society is recognised by most interviewees, for example: *“There should be more civil society engagement with government. Civil society can play a role in external oversight and bring transparency and accountability in the provision of government services and how government projects could be streamlined to reduce corruption”*.¹¹⁸

But civil society organisations in Afghanistan were portrayed as weak, not well supported by the international community, and therefore unable to support tackling corruption:

- *“People here don’t work together very well, probably because of the civil war and things like that. So even civil society is fragmented.”*¹¹⁹
- *“There are lots of fantastic examples of a civil society organisation working with media and exposing this corruption. But most of those activities have been very either localised, or at a national level have been side-lined or silenced. So there has not been the kind of movement we saw, let’s say in India. And I am not surprised that within the current system itself that we have not had an organic leader emerge who could take the issue of corruption at a national level”*.¹²⁰

However, civil society organisations were seen to be increasing in influence over time: *“Civil society and media were less involved and developed than now. We didn’t have information. Now they are more visible and can raise their voice”*.¹²¹ And: *“I think the movement you’re seeing politically, is you’re now seeing civil society saying that it is not a threat to their personal safety to speak out and be vocal as well which is amazing. I think that the announcement that anyone was able to get a copy of the budget was amazing. Those are leaps and bound beyond where they were in 2001 in this county”*.¹²²

The influx of international funds to government institutions placed Afghan civil society in a comparatively weaker position. *“I would say very practically, that we dedicate some of the enormous amount of money that has been thrown out on the PRTs... and support civil society in Afghanistan who is serious about this agenda.that they are not able to maintain independence because if you want to be independent you need funding and a strong position of your own and support - that is what civil society does not feel it is getting from Western governments.”*¹²³

Additionally, there was limited understanding among the IC of what civil society can do: *“I think the international community recognised the need for civil society but they didn’t fully understand what the function of civil society is in the broader context of a healthy society and therefore did not understand how weakness, or absence, or lack of Afghan civil society directly contributed to the corruption problem. ...We threw billions of dollars of aid money around, which hyper-empowered the private sector...and... this really strong government sector relative to the rest of society... But this really under-empowered civil society”*.¹²⁴

“Civil society has not been developed enough to have any impact... And we – we being the international community – have done nothing of substance to develop civil society”¹²⁵

5. The role of international institutions

Summary

Interviewees recognised the central importance of international institutions in leading the international community's response to corruption, and the dangers when they failed to do so. They had the following proposals:

- Both, "national" and "international" corruption should be fought and should be seen being fought.
- Early evidence of the IC's intent to limit corruption is necessary.
- Conversely, an early lack of focus on corruption sets the wrong agenda and leads to low expectations of the IC. This also reduces scope for international institutions to show leadership on the topic, despite their natural leadership role.
- The great autonomy given to the senior individual in charge of international missions needs to be balanced by clear policy guidance on the need to address corruption threats and corruption risks.
- Large international support programmes can be well controlled, despite the difficulties.
- Corruption threats only start to be seriously thought about by the IC after a sizeable, dedicated group has been formed. An international institution, rather than the military, should initiate this.
- Unified command is essential. Unhealthy competition and imbalances between the civilian and military communities, and between various international institutions, severely damages the effectiveness of anti-corruption work.
- International institutions could improve by reviewing and adapting their policies, guidance and practices in relation to corruption threats on international interventions.
- The U.S. military seems to have already started to change its doctrine and guidance in response to the corruption threats, but this does not yet apply to other militaries or to NATO.

They noted good practice from the World Bank that could be adopted elsewhere in respect to the mechanisms for corruption control in large programmes

So far in this analysis we have discussed the actions of the 'international community'. But the IC is far from homogenous. It includes global international institutions like the UN, its Agencies and the World Bank, regional institutions like the EU, international military and police structures like NATO and EUPOL, individual nations contributing to the Mission, a host of specialist national and international agencies, international media and international civil society.

We asked interviewees for their views and conclusions on the way that each of these different IC elements had played a part, or not, in recognising and addressing corruption threats. We had many thoughtful responses, and some partisan ones. We have sought to extract those observations, which shed light on the way in which organisations chose to address corruption

threats among their many other priorities. We also reflect on the ways in which organisations were unable to do this, either because of the political and institutional environment they found themselves in, or for other reasons, and what this means for future missions.

This chapter is broken down into seven sections, one for each of the following:

1. The UN and UNAMA
2. UNDP
3. NATO
4. The World Bank
5. The European Union
6. Individual states
7. Individuals

5.1 The UN and UNAMA

The UN is one of the most critical players in the resolution of international conflicts. Its role was discussed by almost all interviewees, with four predominant themes:

1. First, at the political level, several interviewees commented on the relatively modest role the UN had in Afghanistan:

*XX observed that “It was a strange mission, because it was a hybrid mission: it didn’t have the right amount of blue helmets in that sense, so it was a political mission, not a peacekeeping one in that sense. And therefore it had less levers to pull, but it was a mission which, as always in these things, depended very much on the personality of its top person. There were major actors, the western militaries on the one hand, the World Bank at the other, or the other big donors, and in the middle you had the poor UN, neither doing the peacekeeping nor doing the big dollar amounts for development, and so when Brahimi was in charge and it had authority and there were some quite good people who ran it afterwards, the UN was never in its own institution as powerful a voice as it might have been. In a way that was the UN’s history, it had been there through thick or thin in the country, which also made it many enemies”.*¹²⁶

Similarly, another senior policy maker observed: “We should have had a much bigger role from behind the scenes in getting a proper constitution. The current constitution, despite protestations in the West, is quite appalling, except the chapter on human rights. We should have had a much better role in the elections of 2004 and 2005. In 2002, when we had the emergency Loya Jirga, the warlords were not members of the Jirga but pushed their way in. However, they sat down and commandeered the whole show”.

¹²⁷

2. Second, many observers remarked on the inconsistency of UNAMA, not only in its approach to corruption but to the full spectrum of issues, largely on account of the autonomy given to the SRSG:

From an IC senior policy maker: “The problem with the UN political missions is that far too much power has been decentralised to the SRSGs. His personality and interests thus dictate the organisation’s and its agenda. So something that should be a leitmotif and something that they engage in consistently tends to be grounded in the interests of the SRSG and not driven out of New York, which is unfortunate. So one SRSG may be

interested in tackling the issue whereas the other may not. So I would say inconsistent without being detrimental."¹²⁸

The same effect was evident to Afghans working in UNAMA: *"The SRSG: he is the one who decides. And then his view is important. They you cannot say between 2001 and now because it depends on who is there... in the political office we do most of the job of UNAMA... I can say seriously again, depending on the person, regarding policy or doctrine internal at UNAMA, there were people who were fighting; and individually there were people who were just getting salary and going home."*¹²⁹

3. Third, the UN approach on corruption threats was seen as a passive one. XX commented that *"in principle, UNAMA was concerned with corruption and always asked people to report on the issue. But they never really took much action from that, so people on the ground – I was one of those people on the ground reporting corruption, and got the impression that what was reported to the centre was not being used in any way... So, over time, corruption has lost traction in the UN. Then the UN itself was being exposed as corrupt in a number of recent scandals; particularly UNDP. So the credibility of the UN as a watchdog on corruption has been compromised"*.¹³⁰ This passivity was reflected by others in senior IC positions in Kabul, e.g. in 2011: *"The dominant attitude [towards corruption] was one of passivity in reference to the problem and understanding the political nature of the problem"*.¹³¹

Another experienced observer commented that it was hard for the UN system to source the right people with the right competences for the role: *"The UN you would like to think, in the best of all possible worlds, would play more of a role in these contexts. But the way they function and their incentive structures and their personnel systems are not set up to be governed to be the most effective on the ground. They are set up to make sure that all the various constituency member states in the UN get their piece of the pie. I don't see turning them into a really effective force is necessarily going to happen any time soon"*¹³².

4. What the UN was not doing was what outside observers like ourselves would hope to see – playing a coordinating role on the IC's efforts to recognise and address the corruption threats. E.g.: *"The civilian side was always fragmented. And the UN became so focussed on handling the elections and spent all of the political capital that subsequent successive UN SRSGs had on those questions that they didn't have a lot of space left to really put the aid effort together, and because UNDP was so disregarded by most of the aid community, the UN didn't have the moral authority, even if they had the technical authority, to bring them all together that they might have done"*.¹³³

5.2 UNDP

UNDP came in for criticism from many interviewees. There were problems in the early years, when UNDP was coordinating on behalf of a number of UN agencies. *“They had the coordination role and launched the appeal for UN projects. The heads of the UN agencies on the ground were given 10 days to write \$2.7 billion worth of projects. It was really scandalous. They launched these thousands of projects without consulting the governments and refused to divulge basic information. There was justification in some areas to move quickly – like return of refugees, but a lot of them were things like building schools and hospitals. This was entirely outside the framework of analysis and policy”*.¹³⁴

There were persistent corruption problems with the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), set up in 2002 by UNDP to enable the international community to mobilise resources to strengthen the country’s law enforcement. These problems had a major negative impact on the UN and on the confidence of the IC to speak about corruption in Afghanistan. For example:

- XX commented that *“By the majority of people living or working in Afghanistan, the UN is considered to be the most corrupt organisation working there. So their image is extremely bad. The majority of the anti-corruption work is done by UNDP, which did not insert the necessary checks and balances of spending millions of their money. We had the LOTFA case where they were spending \$1 billion a year without proper checks and balances”*.¹³⁵
- Similarly, from an international policy maker: *“When I pointed out for example the UNLOTFA, Law and Order Trust Fund was billing for non-existent policemen in 2005-2006 on a massive scale... we got rather pushed back by our senior people in the UN; I think the UN has a massive problem with that. The pressure on UN managers across the globe is still primarily on spending the money allocated to their programme”*.¹³⁶

Competition between the UN and the World Bank was also evident to some interviewees, e.g.: *“In 2006 the UN wrested the coordination function away from the World Bank and that, whether it is a correlation or a causal relationship, and my opinion is that it is partly causal, it coincided with a period of declining accountability”*.¹³⁷

The same comment about the great autonomy given to UN SRSG’s was also made of UNDP in respect of corruption. For example, from a former IC Ambassador: *“Under the previous country director, UNDP did a disastrous job. Many of their programmes were subject to corruption. Didn’t take action even when there were reports – people that came forward were punished. Until 2012 they had a bad record. It’s a scandal and an outrage. The new country director, because the situation had gotten so bad, has stepped up and taken some initiatives to clean up a particular project, which was beset by corruption”*.¹³⁸

UNODC attracted little comment, and the other UN agencies received mixed opinions.

5.3 NATO

Corruption threats and corruption generally played no part in international military thinking:

*“There was real resistance on the military side in particular to an understanding of the issue and its contribution to it.”*¹³⁹ Officers responsible for planning the early operations state that the subject just never came up. At best it was ‘not in their mandate’, e.g. *“It would have been much easier if the UN mandate, at least in the early years, had been similar to that for the Kosovo operation. NATO/ ISAF were always very clear that they were not there to govern”*.¹⁴⁰ This started to change around 2009 as a huge increase in resources took place and the need to be more joined up across military and civilian efforts, as well as evidence of the links between corruption and security, began to emerge.

Increasing military attention to corruption threats lagged behind the huge increase in resources:

- As the military campaign was heavy and intrusive, corruption became almost inevitable: *“You look at the military campaign that they designed, and the campaign that they designed is one that is so intrusive and comprehensive and dominant in terms of putting forces on the ground that you are going plough the country with billions and billions of dollars So the strategy you adopt is one of flooding cash into the country”*.¹⁴¹
- *“At the very moment they were starting up all this anti-corruption stuff and trying to oversight for contracts, contracts were increasing exponentially because of the surge. So at the very moment they were trying to something about the problem they were also making it exponentially more difficult to do anything about the problem”*.¹⁴²
- The big increase in ISAF attention to corruption came around 2009-10. *“We could’ve started doing what was done in 2010 sooner. As you begin to ramp up in Afghanistan and as you start to pour substantial amounts of additional forces, funds, civilians, and other assets into the country, that is the time to increase focus and elements to try to identify and then deal with the cancer that is corruption”*.¹⁴³

The establishment of Shafafiyat in 2010 marked a more proactive ISAF approach to tackling corruption. It took a focussed approach, centred on the key political corruption issues of Criminal Patronage Networks, as explained in Chapter 3.

- This change of approach was also recognised by policy-makers on the civilian side: *“We deliberately didn’t look at corruption in the broader sense. We went at what the American military calls CPNs (criminal patronage networks) and so we were deliberately going in at the hard end of this and where this was this nexus of drugs trafficking, insurgency, and reaching into the state. One of the things I hadn’t realised until that phase, and in some ways was one of the last things I said when I left, was the Venn diagram with those three circles was much tighter than I had appreciated at the local level”*.¹⁴⁴

However this greater effort by the military was not always welcomed on the civilian side:

“NATO felt that the IC did not step up to the mark to take on the corruption thing for example. And then when NATO did go and do something about it, there was a big outcry from the IC to say what are the military doing taking on this role? So both parties were at fault”.¹⁴⁵ Shafafiyat also generated criticism from the civilian community for over-stepping its natural mandate: *“When General Petraeus came in and created the anti-corruption taskforce, Shafafiyat, I think he overstepped. I think General McChrystal had it about right. Where General McChrystal is giving guidance to his commanders – tell them this is*

*important, look at contracting, look at how you give money out; that was all very useful. But when the taskforce was established, what he did is he took the problem of corruption and militarised it. He militarised it in the Afghan eyes..... It should have stayed with military contracting and the ANSF”.*¹⁴⁶

There was a call for more balanced leadership between military and civilians: The excess weight of the military reportedly worked against any coordinated approach to corruption: *“In NATO, which was the big kid on the block in everything, there hadn’t really been a balance between the military and the civilian. The civilian international leadership was very dispersed. So [the solution] was to essentially put a civilian four star alongside the military four star... Had somebody been doing that job at that level two or three years before, it might well have happened then. But everybody recognised the big issue in Afghanistan that had to be sorted out... was Afghanistan going to be able to sustain itself against a continuing insurgency? The military could contribute resources and they had skills in the area but they couldn’t possibly do it all. Nor could they work effectively with the aid community without some sort of translation mechanism”.*¹⁴⁷

Even after Shafafiyat had been set up, **counter-corruption efforts were also damaged by inconsistencies of strategy and of military leadership.** Two senior policy makers who have been involved on and in Afghanistan over many years put it as the following: *“I think the challenge is be more consistent across players and over time. My sense was that there is such a huge transition of staff – nobody has done anything consistently. Therefore institutional memory is one of the challenges we’re facing.”*¹⁴⁸ *“I am not optimistic because changing institutions and bureaucracies is difficult. ... The rotation issue has been recognised as an issue for 10 years. But we have seen very little improvement in it and there are very good bureaucratic reasons for that.”*¹⁴⁹

5.4 World Bank

The World Bank received mostly positive comments from interviewees on its approach to corruption risks:

- *“ARTF [The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund – one of the major IC funding vehicles] pooled donor support in an environment of weak institutions. It wasn’t straight budget support – it was a way of reimbursing what had been spent. They had to assure the World Bank and demonstrate receipts for spending in order to receive the money... It was also externally and independently audited and gave us a relative level of assurance.”*¹⁵⁰
- *“I know for the World Bank, corruption has been a big issue in terms of funding big projects in terms of dams and electricity grids”.*¹⁵¹
- *“The World Bank, for example, has funded the National Solidarity Programme, which by its nature being a localised community based development project was able to keep more [of a] check on corruption. It wasn’t about giving large rewards to key figures. It was working at the local level”.*¹⁵²
- *“There has been a set of anti-corruption benchmarks on the WB’s engagement in the ARTF.”*¹⁵³
- *“When the World Bank had the oversight through the LTF and the national programme system, the dual-key mechanism provided the checks and balances as a catalyst for accountability.”*¹⁵⁴
- *“There’s a huge difference between 2001 and now; it was the same for all agencies.... There might be different reasons, and as I said the breaking point was 2006-2007 when*

corruption became an issue to the government and the donors. Each accusing the other. Bill Byrd and the World Bank were also drivers for mapping corruption in Afghanistan.”¹⁵⁵

- *“The World Bank is at least for us very useful because they set very strict conditionality in the area of fighting of corruption”.¹⁵⁶*

Nonetheless, there were also criticisms:

- *“The World Bank was poor in addressing the issue [of corruption]. They seem to have a high tolerance for it. No measures to mitigate it. Accept it as a cost of doing business here. When the subject has come up I’ve been disappointed in their lack of interest in raising it as an issue or even taking what I would think are obvious measures to ensure the integrity of the program”¹⁵⁷*
- *“One of the things that was most striking about the WB, about Trust Fund, I nearly fell out of my chair when someone told me that their auditing mechanism was ‘Not designed to detect fraud.’ Basically, say for example, they get the receipt from the ministry of education and give the money for the cost for the chairs. I asked if anyone actually goes to the school to see if the chairs exist and they said no. I understand that there are some security concerns, but there are ways to work with local authorities and local NGOs to verify these things. That money could be used for anything”¹⁵⁸*
- *“The World Bank, because they have such stringent contracting rules and that kind of thing, they’re a little bit better. However, again, they don’t have enough people out in the field. So when they put out an RFP or call for proposals it’s the same cast of characters winning, after winning, after winning. And once you get onto the World Bank standard offer agreement there’s very little follow up in the field as to whether people are actually producing, and doing what they’re supposed to be doing”¹⁵⁹*

5.5 The European Union (EU)

The EU mission in Afghanistan was a small one so it was not at the centre of IC efforts in the same way that the UN was. However, again its impact was cited as depending on the personality of the head of the political mission: *“The EU was concerned about the issue depending on who was running the mission. When Vendrell – the special representative – was running the EU political mission, I think there was more concern over corruption.”¹⁶⁰* *“In terms of programmes, they have been actively involved in the rule of law area and they see anti-corruption as a subset of that.”¹⁶¹*

The most active group in the EU, though under-resourced, was EUPOL: *“They brought in some awfully good people. And they have done individually some very good work.”¹⁶²*

Nevertheless, the EU received a decidedly mixed review from interviewees: *“I don’t have a single memory of the EU addressing anti-corruption. I think they came to some of the meetings that we had. They worked on security sector reform, but not very successfully.”¹⁶³* *“The [EU] line was ‘it’s a national issue’. It does not concern us.”¹⁶⁴*

5.6 States

Four themes emerged from interviewee comments on individual states:

- i. Public opinion in the home country drove actions on corruption as much as, or more than, policy makers. The change of mood against Afghanistan was to a significant degree pushed by corruption stories, such as 'Warlord Inc.'
- ii. A major change of strategy, from an intelligence-/special forces-led operation in 2001-2003 – which by its nature involved co-opting warlords and individuals - to a full-scale engagement from 2004, meant that corruption as an issue would start on the back burner for most states. It did not get on to the policy radar until evidence that corruption had an impact on security emerged in around 2009.
- iii. There is a wide range of opinion towards the issue of corruption across international actors. Some states, for example Denmark, were regarded by several interviewees as particularly interested in corruption and transparency issues. Others were seen as not that interested or concerned.
- iv. The U.S., by far deeply engaged and influential state in Afghanistan, had no comprehensive view on the corruption threats to the mission. There were many in the State Department with a highly developed understanding of the issue, but the same understanding was not found elsewhere in the U.S. government. Up until 2010, DoD, the military and USAID were seen to be driven primarily by incentives to spend, not to ensure that the spending was effective and non-corrupt.

Nordic countries were generally similarly well regarded by interviewees, because of the care that they took over the use of their funds. *"The main donors that have been more involved (on anti-corruption) have been Denmark and Norway"*.¹⁶⁵

5.7 Individuals

Interviewees were asked to identify international leaders who were most prominent in highlighting or addressing corruption as an issue in Afghanistan, and in pushing for reform.

The principal finding was how many interviewees commented that no one had taken a strong profile on this topic: *"I think coordination of the international community is very weak because none of us probably want to be coordinated by the other. But I don't think there is a clear leader on anti-corruption."*¹⁶⁶ *"I've dealt with senior British people and senior Americans on the ground and corruption was never brought up as an issue."*¹⁶⁷

Across the 34 interviewees that did name individuals, three names were cited most frequently, by a significant margin: the first head of the ISAF Shafaiyat Anti-Corruption taskforce, Major General HR McMaster, and General Stanley McChrystal and General David Petraeus, both former Commanders of ISAF Forces.

All three individuals, McChrystal, McMaster and Petraeus received mention from experts in a range of fields, from aid specialists to diplomats, which demonstrated that visibility of their actions on anti-corruption was not confined internally to the military. The Afghan leaders named the most were Dr Abdullah, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr Spanta.

6. Building the army, the police and rule of law

Summary

Interviewees had the following proposals for building integrity and reducing corruption risk in the military, police, and rule of law institutions:

- Unified international leadership of the training effort is essential
- Training police in post-conflict countries is really hard, and mostly beyond the current capabilities of the IC; how to do it better needs a lot of thought
- Building the military and police force must include explicit work on transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC)
- Programmes to train-the-IC trainers on TACC need to start early
- International military trainers naturally avoid soft but difficult subjects like TACC, in favour of hard skills; this must be resisted
- International militaries need better doctrine, training and exercises to improve their understanding of corruption threats on operations
- Work immediately to establish an independent investigative body
- Start working early with the judiciary and enlarge specialist crime investigating agencies

One of the distinguishing features of the intervention in Afghanistan was the huge investment that the IC poured into the Afghan military and police. As XX put it, “*the situation is comparable perhaps only to the experience of Vietnam, where the international community... shored up a client state by immense investment in an oversized military*”.¹⁶⁸ As the primary recipients of international funds, their future role in stabilising the Afghan environment will be crucial.

The dominance of the military and police as core enablers is clear when looking at the interview transcripts. An analysis of word frequency reveals that words like ‘police’ (1014 occurrences), ‘security’ (393) and ‘army’ (178) dominate, while ‘transparency’ (54), ‘accountability’ (95) and ‘justice’ (92) occur far less frequently.

A secondary focus of our analysis has been to ask whether enough has been done to train sustainable military and police forces. The four main areas picked out by interviewees as crucial to this process were: procurement, promotion, payment and oversight.

A strong need for integrity-focussed training and consistent messaging from IC mentors was also noted by interviewees as a core part of ensuring that international investment in the military and police yields positive results.

Interviewees recognised that training police and military forces in a conflict or post-conflict environment was difficult, and not something for which a pre-established approach could be defined: “*the person who discovers a way of training a police force in a post-conflict country would deserve a Nobel peace prize*”.¹⁶⁹ It is therefore understandable that efforts to build a functioning army and police force evolved with experience.



Figure 6: Security officers on the streets of Kabul in October 2013 (source: Xinhua: [//news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2013-10/12/c_132791376.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2013-10/12/c_132791376.htm))

6.1 Training the ANA

The ANA benefitted from the fact that there was one main trainer – the U.S. – with a single organisation having complete control over the training input. As one U.S. policy maker put it: “*the Americans started building [the Afghan military] pretty early on... So they had more time to build that as an institution. In the military, Americans were really big on trying to recruit... and they did all kinds of things on quality control*”.¹⁷⁰ XX recounted how they had achieved a certain level of institutional learning through reducing international staff turnover: “*I requested to have the team for a year and not to have them switched, because a new team would be exposed to plans they didn’t understand, and good connections and relations and recognition of who they are dealing with would be lost.*”¹⁷¹

The oversight structure for military training was therefore relatively easy to manage, a state of affairs that was aided by the control structure that was built in the ANA. In comparison to the Afghan National Police (ANP), the command was tightly centralised to cut down the number of actors who needed to approve decisions.

One interviewee gave a very practical example of this: “*ANA patrols and ANA check-posts were much preferred by truck drivers carrying basic goods. The problem is the ANP, because the ANP is structured around a district and comes under the mayor. The mayor comes under some*

kind of parallel government... So the head of police in Kandahar couldn't do anything without [the mayor] signing off on it".¹⁷²

The way that the military was designed also contributed to reducing the opportunities that army personnel had to engage in corrupt practices. XX reflected that *"one of the reasons you see less corruption in the Army is that they have less opportunity for corruption. They have less interaction with citizens. And that is why former minister Wardak didn't want the army playing a policing role. He knew that if the army played [a role] that there would be more opportunity to take bribes".¹⁷³* Oversight was therefore fairly strong over the military's activities, with both U.S. trainers and the Afghan government aware of the risks involved in deploying new troops into an insecure and highly corrupt environment.

Nevertheless, the system for developing and training the ANA had its flaws. Many interviewees commented on the way in which rapid rotations of international military training staff increased corruption risk. The lack of continuity and the deliberate exploitation of the handovers by Afghans were reported as being *"very harmful"*¹⁷⁴ to efforts to build a functional Afghan military. There were also reported concerns that *"the focus was on developing the army, training and equipment. There was very little effort placed on developing the administration, creating the personnel and systems".¹⁷⁵* While elements of the ANA experience might serve as an example of positive practice for both military and police training in the future, there is a need to refine the process.

ISAF and international trainers on corruption prevention

A recurring theme throughout the interviews was the lack of training and doctrinal guidance for those training the ANA. This was, however, a problem that participants saw as being readily solvable if time was taken to institutionalise integrity programmes such as anti-corruption training. A former government official offered the following advice: *"The way to get at this is to get it into the institutional side of the military services and that is through doctrinal field manuals, through the courses that are run for the commissioned/non-commissioned officer leaders through the scenarios for training at the combat training centres, and then in the lessons learned centres".¹⁷⁶*

Interviewees praised some of ISAF's efforts to raise awareness of corruption for ISAF personnel in Afghanistan, for example the 'Anti-Corruption guidance for the IC military on the scale and importance of corruption'. This guidance, which came jointly from the ISAF Commander and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative was specific and clear on how it expected ISAF to act in respect of corruption.

Including guidance on corruption in the overall counter-insurgency strategy seems to have catalysed the inclusion of similar components in the training of both international and Afghan military. A U.S. military officer reports his own experience of this as the following: *"We added a significant amount of pre-deployment training for units on their way to Afghanistan. I myself went to the First Armor Division in Texas and talked to them. We had other representatives go out and talk to them. And gave anti-corruption to leaders at the COIN academy when they first showed up in the country – what we call 'COIN Leaders Course'. And the Army Centre for Lessons Learnt came out and spent some time with the taskforce to collect how doctrine and training needed to change in order to account for the problem of corruption in these types of operations. My understanding is that they developed a report and that is going into the rewrite and modifications of doctrine".¹⁷⁷*

Similarly, there were remarks that suggest that ISAF began to get better at raising procurement and financial management awareness among its personnel by the end of the mission: *“I know from governors and directors from department that ISAF organised some lectures, and sometimes, probably twice, we had in our bases a conference for local government about economic issues, about funds, about budget and how to spend it, how to construct it.”*¹⁷⁸

6.2 Building integrity in the ANA

Our interviewees reported that military training, although relatively well developed in terms of putting together an Afghan army that had access to military equipment, fell short in terms of the sort of comprehensive institution-building that would have developed doctrine and ethics that could tackle corruption. One interviewee comments how *“the focus was on developing the army, training and equipment. There was very little effort placed on developing the administration, creating the personnel and systems”*.¹⁷⁹

This one-sided focus was cited as one of the reasons that reformers were unable to understand or control *“deeply entrenched factional interests”*¹⁸⁰ that ran through the old army administration. A senior military officer urged future mission leaders to *“test organisations to see if they can get to a more inclusive political order through how we spend our money, with how we engage, which leaders we empower and really understand the drivers of these local or micro-level conflicts”*.¹⁸¹

The failure to adopt a comprehensive training approach that could tackle mind-set and behaviour as well as reforming military institutional processes is one of the main regrets expressed by those who were closely involved. There was a strong call to adopt clear and consistent messaging in terms of the ethics and behaviour that should be expected from an army. Another senior officer pressed future leaders to: *“first, be realistic about your expectations. Scale your effort appropriately, and set your levels of ambition appropriately. If you are going into a war-torn country and try to start over and build an army, then you are going to need to think very carefully about the problems of corruption throughout the organisation – you are going to need sophistication in the effort”*.¹⁸²

6.3 Reforming institutional processes in the ANA

ANA – Promotion and purchase of posts

The promotion of military personnel is a high-risk area in terms of corruption threats to building an effective army. Without strong institutional structures, factionalism, nepotism and patronage can quickly take root. In Afghanistan, this was one of the key problems identified by interviewees when asked about the future of the ANA. One notes that *“promotion of ranks within the ANA was seen as a very challenging issue that was affected again by nepotism and also the affiliation of political parties and groups... Promotion was not taking place... based on merit or years of experience, so there is a lot of complaint by ANA people about their own ministry”*.¹⁸³

The purchase of posts was also a core problem identified in the military. Promotions were reportedly sold for huge sums of money, meaning that the top levels of command were not only implicated in corrupt practices but that they often had pressing incentives to get money to repay the loans they had taken out for their positions. As a senior military officer who was involved in training the ANA recounted: *“In 2010, when we were putting together the new 215 Corps, we had no commander until less than two days before the parade. I was told this was because he*

hadn't raised the \$100,000 to pay for the post. He would have been expected to make this back through the letting of contracts".¹⁸⁴

ANA - Salary payment

One important area where interviewees reported that the ANA had made progress throughout the mission was pay. XX described the improvement: *"In the last few years they [the ANA] have changed the system used to pay soldiers their salaries. Now they at least get some money without interference from their superiors."* adding that *"this was the most serious issue... having guys out there fighting for their country and they then had to pay bribes to get their salaries"*.¹⁸⁵

ANA - Procurement

Procurement is one of the areas where militaries face a high corruption risk. The secrecy afforded to large swathes of defence contracting and bidding procedures mean that many countries with highly developed militaries still struggle to reduce their own corruption risks in this area. Building transparent procurement processes into a brand new military in a highly unstable environment is always going to be a challenge.

Integrity in procurement is rapidly becoming more important for the ANA as the IC withdraws and the ANA takes over procurement processes that have hitherto been run largely by the IC. Experience so far has been mixed. Recognition by interviewees that the Afghan National Army (ANA) *"has a lot of procurement processes whereby there had been corruption involved, and the friends we know have been contracted, they talk to us about how much they bribe people and how much share they give to others to get those large procurement projects"*¹⁸⁶ highlights both a critical and a complex challenge for Afghanistan going forwards.

6.4 Training the police

The international effort on building the national police was much weaker than with the ANA.

There were many different leaderships and programmes, with a visible lack of overall coordination. Once taken over by ISAF, police training accelerated, but was still the poor relation of training for the ANA.

The main criticism levelled at the approach taken with the ANP was the lack of a coordinated, long-term vision for police reform. As one interviewee put it, there was *"an under-appreciation of the situation in Afghanistan – optimism that the police can be reformed fairly quickly [while] not taking in [to account] the factionalism within the Afghan force"*.¹⁸⁷

The lack of a durable strategy was exacerbated by the involvement of a large coalition of international actors. XX notes how *"Each of them [the IC countries] brought something from their own country and taught it to [the Afghans]. In other words in the same entity you have different training and doctrine. The same isn't applied to the army"*.¹⁸⁸

There was also limited police training expertise available. For example, this meant that the mentorship system largely consisted of non-police specialists: a clear weakness in the programme. XX discussed this problem, stating how *"sadly it was often a military mentor trying to mentor a police leader"*.¹⁸⁹ Interviewees tended to agree that, while police integrity training had made some positive gains, in general the ANP *"need a lot more leadership training, integrity training, training in loyalty, training in what being a police [force] is"*.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, a former UNAMA

official described how *“there’s very little room within the UN system for hiring a country specialist ... [People] do counter corruption for UNDP in Bangkok, in Kenya, in I don’t know where... We don’t have enough people coming from a background of police”*.¹⁹¹

The core funding mechanism itself – LOTFA – had significant corruption weaknesses that were exploited by police officers, already discussed in Chapter 4.

6.5 Building integrity in the police

Police integrity training received mixed reviews from interviewees. In terms of good practice, there does seem to have been a concerted effort to get anti-corruption onto the radar. For example, one interviewee related how *“EUPOL had done a lot of anti-corruption training. And they developed an anti-corruption plan, and a lot of training of the police”*,¹⁹² while another recounted how *“we do have an anti-corruption in the training... there is an anti-corruption course. It starts at the lowest level to the advance classes. The train-the-trainers in principle let the Afghans train their own people and they have to go through anti-corruption training”*.¹⁹³ There was also a mentorship programme, which had getting the *“culture of corruption to at least abate”*¹⁹⁴ as a specific goal.

Another interviewee was visibly impressed by the attitude taken by new ANP recruits when faced with integrity training, describing how: *“they ran this officer training course and that course in particular had anti-corruption piece in it. I don’t know how big it was. I walked into the class one day and they were talking about corruption. The young men that were sitting at the tables, it was really quite inspiring. To look at them, you could see the future of the ANP as being quite promising, if they’re ever able to get into senior positions”*.¹⁹⁵

There are also positive signs that corruption prevention and investigation mechanisms are slowly improving, for example through the nascent Police Inspector General system: *“From 2010 you have the Inspector General of the MOI – an American idea - acquired functionality. They started training inspectors to go around and investigate cases. They are still developing the capacity. They now have inspectors in every region”*.¹⁹⁶

However the time available for training was very short. XX proposed that more time be taken over tackling corruption issues in future: *“Police training is 6-8 weeks, so not much time for human rights, corruption, and gender issues while you’re learning about policing, which is ridiculous. No matter what you train on, when you send them into field and commander says I need 200 dollars, it doesn’t matter what you’ve been trained on. In one respect they launched an A-C effort, which is a code of conduct signed by the ministry last year and they’ve done code of conduct training reaching out to police at the beginning. But again the problem is as above. It takes a long time to embed and we’re not even close doing to that. It’s a sign that people are making time for them, but it need to be complimented in leadership”*.¹⁹⁷

6.6 Reforming institutional processes in the police

ANP – Promotions and purchase of posts

Initially, there seemed to be a lack of IC attention on the development of the Afghan police forces. Interviewees noted that attention to the destabilising effect of a corrupt police force increased as time went by, and that promotion procedures were the first priority for reform. A leading expert on Afghanistan reported that: *“the U.S. became much more actively involved and there was a brief moment in 2006-07 when the international community recognised the very damaging effects of a corrupt and predatory police leadership in Afghanistan on state legitimacy and security. There was then an effort to go into a more rigorous vetting process. This was where the IC had consensus on the importance of merit based appointments”*.¹⁹⁸

Once IC consensus on the importance of improved promotion policy was secured, reform was reportedly fairly successful: *“There were tests and a ranking system, to the point that UNAMA was quite involved and a few individuals within UNAMA like Eckhart Schiewek were so involved that it became close to becoming a security risk for them”*.¹⁹⁹

ANP – Salary payment

Payment of police officers was another area where interviewees noted significant progress. A police advisor credits the American approach, stating that they *“were very good at recognising that the police have to be paid well”*.²⁰⁰ UNDP also received praise in this area, with an aid worker commenting how they *“managed to pay the police officers, which was one of the biggest challenges. And they managed to remove a lot of ghost officers off the payroll”*.²⁰¹

These reforms tackled a very real connection between payment procedures and corruption that had left corruption prevalent in the early ANP. As a senior U.S. officer recalls, there were links between payment, promotion and the collection of bribes on a large scale: *“I routinely saw police on the street shaking down average ordinary citizens for bribes. And it’s all connected. In other words, there is no such thing as petty corruption. The police commander had to pay \$5m dollars for his position. He has five subordinate commanders and he expects one million dollars out of each of them. They each have their subordinate guys that he expects tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars from and it works its way down to the average cop on the street who has to... it’s a pyramid scheme where he has to suck up money from the citizenry to push up the chain in order to pay the bills for everybody’s position”*.²⁰²

Interviewees did, however, emphasise that these reforms were relatively small-scale, highlighting the fact that *“taking the sort of fight against corruption from that level to something that was really going to make a difference is obviously very hard”*.²⁰³

ANP - Procurement

Interviewees noted the significant long-term challenges for the ANP, and that one of the most pressing reforms needed was an overhaul of procurement. An Afghan journalist put it this way: *“The police is still very, very corrupt in Afghanistan... A generational change is needed inside the MoI but at the same time we need to change a lot of procedure inside the Ministry to make it more transparent, especially their procurement procedure... It should be more open, inclusive, transparent”*.²⁰⁴

6.7 Rule of law

Interviewees stressed the relative success of building rule of law in Afghanistan, emphasising the need to focus on developing integrity in the judiciary as early as possible, and the importance of allowing anti-corruption experts to develop the rule of law.

Rule of law was described as being central to tackling corruption: *“You cannot deal with corruption unless you can build the rule of law. The international forces are very good at training a national army. The international community on the British model of an army is pretty good at building an army. Every army has its own justice system – if you don’t do as I tell you then I can discipline you internally”*,²⁰⁵ and as being as important if not more important than building integrity in the police force: *“I would have focussed more on a judiciary that was independent and respected. I would have started there rather than a police force”*.²⁰⁶

Many interviewees emphasised that an absence of the rule of law affects other national institutions, and leads to corruption:

- *“We recognised that security forces and institutions, if not connected to rule of law, are of limited value and could actually be dangerous or counterproductive. So we focussed on the judiciary as well.”*²⁰⁷
- *“Without a solid rule of law running in the country all the other pillars of government start to crumble. It all needs to be supported by rule of law, which the population has confidence in. Rather than this continual culture of impunity, which of course the population see and then start pull back from supporting the government.”*²⁰⁸
- *“We were pushing very hard for the rule of law because if you looked at what caused real disaffection between the population and the Afghan state, corruption was a symptom of it, but it was the abuse of power, and the absence of the rule of law, and the fact that in many cases the police force was being seen as a predatory force... essentially an armed militia”*²⁰⁹

The development of the rule of law in Afghanistan was only partially successful, for two main reasons. First, the focus on developing integrity within the police force led to the neglect of other aspects of the rule of law, and secondly, because the international community began building the rule of law at too late a stage:

- Although the development of integrity within the police force was being pursued, two other aspects of the rule of law were being neglected: *“one is prison detention centres and... one is the legal side of the house. His [Petraeus’] response to diplomats that voiced the same concerns about why the military is getting into this was – ‘because no one else had’”*.²¹⁰ One senior government official stressed the importance of overhauling detention centres: *“to help the Afghans with their own detention centres – quite an important element of rule of law needless to say. Of course prisons and other places are where corruption can be a cancer eroding the rule of law.”*²¹¹
- Building rule of law needs to start early, and takes a long time. A senior policy maker summed up the views: *“Rule of law is really hard. It is harder in ODA terms anyway because you end up funding things that are pretty close to the edge of the definition or sometimes on the other side of it. I am firmly of the view that that is the thing that takes longest because it is absolutely in the DNA of the country concerned”*²¹² and the international community shifted its focus too late: *“We really didn’t start into the rule of law until way too late in the campaign”*²¹³

Building rule of law should be done by experts: *“I think one of the lessons that we Afghans have learned, I think we had been talking about it early but no one was listening to it: improve rule of law. And instead of appointing people in the key positions based on political affiliation... it has to be more based on technical professionalism”,*²¹⁴ and with a combined effort from both military and civilians. As one senior policy maker asked: *“When does corruption finally get looked at by the military, and both the international community and the domestic police?”*²¹⁵

“We really didn’t start into the rule of law until way too late in the campaign”

International policy-maker, 25.09.2013

7. A framework for policy makers

Our analysis suggests that the international community does not yet have a coherent approach, either within individual organisations and states or across the wider international community, to the serious corruption issues that international support for a fragile nation is likely to be exposed to.

Interviewees - whether civilian, military or police; in government, outside government or in international organisations - stressed the urgent need for a more proactive approach.

Because the topic, by its nature, cuts across organisational and institutional boundaries, interviewees recognised that this was not an easy task. Corruption comprises a complex range of interconnected issues, from kleptocracy through to local corruption in daily services. In general, western policy makers have underestimated the impact of such systematic corruption.²¹⁶ Finally, because the subject acts as a sort of 'lightning conductor' for frustration and anger among the population, it has immense public visibility. It is therefore a very public test of the values and standards of the donor countries.

We have taken a first step below to provide a framework that can be used by policy-makers. It is designed to be used by policy makers as a check-list against which to measure whether the organisation's current policies and practices add up to a coherent approach. It can also be used each time the nation (or international institution) is planning a military intervention or some other form of technical assistance or intervention.

The framework consists of five topics:

1. Early consideration of corruption threats
2. Equipping policy-makers and implementers
3. International civilian leadership
4. Prudent use of funds
5. Oversight and transparency

1. Early consideration of corruption threats

a. Analyse the issues

“Keep the corruption issue on the front burner even in the early stages of an intervention” XX

The range of possible corruption threats needs to be analysed at the beginning of, or even before, any assistance or intervention. The analysis can be started simply – as a local exercise at the embassy in the country receiving the assistance – or more thoroughly, looking at the ways in which assistance can be diverted or misused, strengthen elites or criminal groups, or assist terrorism. Such an analysis should include:

- An understanding of the political dynamics and the individuals
- ‘Unpacking’ the corruption issues in the host nation environment

- Integrating the likely impact of corruption on citizens into the mission narrative
- Bringing the military and police perspective on corruption threats into the discussion early
- Developing some potential responses to corruption challenges that could face the first wave of troops and international staff

Such an analysis should be much more focussed on the political dynamics than the technical aspects of corruption. As one policy maker put it: *“I think we need to have much more of a political strategy from the outset, a political understanding of the problem, and a political understanding of the conflict and drivers of conflict to inform our response”*.²¹⁷

The analysis should also review the integrity-building and corruption prevention experience of those participating in the intervention. It should develop indicators designed to flag the misuse of funds and/or assistance.

Systematically analysing the lessons learned about corruption

Many interviewees reported how they already ‘knew’ the lessons about corruption from previous international missions. But such reviews have rarely, if ever, been done. In the later years in Afghanistan there was a systematic effort from the military, through ISAF, to analyse the key lessons. Their efforts led to two reports, one at the strategic level and one at the operational level, which collected a lot of specific lessons for the military. Carrying out systematic reviews like this should be, in our view, an integral part of all missions; but they should be both civilian and security, not just military. The two NATO reports are *“Counter- and Anti-Corruption”*, from NATO's Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, June 27, 2013. Available at http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/jallc_report_corruption_releasable.pdf and the JCOA report ‘Operationalizing Counter/Anti-Corruption’ available at http://nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Schools/NIPCONS/nipcons-institutions/CIPS/Download%20Section/JCOA%20CAC%20Final%20Report_U.pdf

b. Inclusion in the mandate

The need to address corruption threats should be included in the mandate and the design of the mission that flows from it.

Experience suggests that settlements designed at an early stage with state-building and ‘clean’ institutions as primary goals are more durable than those where corruption is put to one side. For example, a recent study found that—on average—countries that had integrity provisions negotiated into peace settlements experienced a clear increase in controlling corruption compared to those that did not.²¹⁸ Agreements with detailed and explicit anti-corruption provisions stand a better chance of long-term success and sustainability. Counter-corruption considerations need to be factored into the negotiating process and the design of international missions on the basis of a clear understanding of the extent of corruption and how—as well as through whom—it operates.

The Arusha Agreement, signed in 2000 to end the civil war in Burundi, provides a practical illustration of the importance of counter-corruption considerations in securing a durable

settlement. The agreement outlined a wide range of explicit and detailed anti-corruption principles targeted at many sectors of society including public administration, health, justice and the economy. International donor assistance helped fund anti-corruption programmes and build capacity to fight corruption. The Agreement's relative success in delivering 'clean' institutions and services is largely attributable to the fact that reform measures were targeted from the Office of the President of Burundi down to the grassroots of society.²¹⁹

The same approach – of explicitly including attention to corruption threats – needs similarly to be taken with smaller technical assistance missions.

c. Calibrating the scale of the corruption issue

There will be corruption issues in every country; and the more that the country is in conflict or experiencing major insecurity, the more serious these problems are likely to be. One of the deepest and most painful lessons from Afghanistan was that once corruption reaches a certain high level, it ceases to be an aberration of the system but becomes the system. At such a high level of corruption, almost all possible interventions or forms of assistance are likely to fail. Some work is starting in think-tanks on ways to identify and calibrate the scale of 'kleptocratic' capture.²²⁰

Specialist cell tracking illicit money flows

The need to track the movement of illicit funds, whether from theft, corruption, narcotics or other sources, was important in Afghanistan, as it became clear that such funds were not only for personal enrichment, but also for funding the insurgency and perpetuating a kleptocratic system of governance. In due course various specialist cells were set up, such as the Afghan Threat Finance Cell. Such cells can be an important anti-corruption tool for the international community.

2. Equipping policy makers and implementers

a. Better equipping international policy makers

National and international policy makers need training, doctrine and guidance on how to recognise the range and potential importance of corruption threats. This can be addressed at three levels:

- i. **Providing education, training and policy guidance for policy makers and others in the host nation and in the IC.** For example, policy dilemma training on how to deal with corrupt actors when there is no choice, how to channel money safely when there are no good control mechanisms, and how to authorise projects when the institutional checking mechanisms are imperfect or non-existent.
- ii. **Building understanding and experience of the use of corruption prevention instruments and other tools relating to corruption.** Corruption-limiting tools range from specific mechanisms, like dual key controls on spending or the use of joint national-international monitoring committees, through to large-scale tools like Anti-Corruption Agencies.

- iii. **Developing specific expertise on recognising and addressing corruption threats in fragile state environments.** Transparency, accountability and counter-corruption (TACC) needs to be recognised and developed within the organisation or member state as a formal ‘discipline’.

b. Better equipping international military, police and rule of law personnel

In a similar vein to the guidance for policy makers above, the international military, police and rule of law actors engaged in assistance or interventions need training, guidance and exercises to instil an understanding of corruption threats and how to limit them.

This is perhaps the ‘easiest’ element of the framework, in that the armed services generally have a structured approach to competence development. As one interviewee put it: *“The way to get at this is to get it into the institutional side of the military services, and that is through doctrinal field manuals, through the courses that are run for the commissioned/ non-commissioned officer leaders through the scenarios for training at the combat training centres, and then in the lessons learned centres.”*²²¹

Material to support such competence development is already beginning to emerge, e.g. at NATO HQ with its ‘Building Integrity programme’²²², some available doctrine manuals, e.g. from U.S. Joint Force Command²²³ and recent ‘Lessons learned’ documents from NATO and others.²²⁴

Training in ways to address corruption threats needs a very practical focus. For example, some interviewees suggested that it should be a part of normal military procedure that the impact on corruption be one of the stress tests of a proposed operation: *“You should test every operation, initiative, and policy practice by asking whether it will take more bad guys off the street than it creates. Corruption is one of those that create more bad guys than it takes off the street if you will, so you have to go after it.”*²²⁵ Another commented on taking on projects in highly insecure areas: *“Stop all high-risk behaviours and projects: make sure conducting high-dollar construction projects in insecure areas: you might as well just be transferring money to illegal armed groups or organised crime networks”.*²²⁶

c. The counter-corruption ‘toolbox’

Along with increasing expertise, policy-makers need explicit guidance on ‘what is in the counter-corruption toolbox’, the relative merits/demerits of each component, and how each one can be scaled up when required.

The headings would include, inter alia:

- Formal organisations like anti-corruption agencies.
- Integrity and corruption performance indicators.
- Setting up external oversight.
- Available integrity and corruption-prevention training for government officials, military, police, and others.
- Specific corruption awareness training available for those destined to be ‘mentors’.
- Advice on strategic options like how to give more emphasis to bread and butter corruption issues, not just on grand corruption.
- Advice on how to establish anti-corruption expert groups within and across the government.
- Changes required to operational contracting for the mission.

- How to improve the quality and training of IC advisers.
- How to review and vet the competence/integrity of government officials.
- Lessons learned from past assistance and interventions.
- Most frequent (expected) dilemmas, questions and answers.

We would like to see the UN develop a handbook of guidance on this topic. If that proves not to be possible, we recommend that each organisation that has an involvement in international missions, national and international, develop its own guidance on the corruption-prevention tools available to policy-makers.

TI-DSP has made a first effort in this direction of giving guidance, with its recent handbook, "Corruption threats and interventions: guidance for leaders". For more information, see: www.ti-defence.org.

“Be realistic about your expectations. Scale your effort appropriately, and set your levels of ambition appropriately. If you are going in to a war-torn country and try to start over and build an army, then you are going to need to think very carefully about the problems of corruption throughout the organisation – you are going to need sophistication in the effort.”

International Policy Maker, 08.11.2013

d. Strengthening national military, police, and rule of law actors

Integrity-building and corruption-prevention training need to be built into the fabric of the training for national military, security, and rule of law actors.

Such training should be included in all plans for technical assistance and interventions by those responsible for capacity-building. Wherever there is such a requirement in the future, there is a need for a sophisticated approach in relation to both military and police forces. This will need to encompass awareness-training, doctrine and exercises. It will also require better training of the trainers (as in c. above)

In respect of the police, there currently seem to be no well-recognised way in which training local police in a conflict or post conflict environment can be done effectively. It is a harder task than the army, given how closely police forces are intertwined with national politics and control over land and power. The subject merits urgent study by states and international organisations (including the EU and the World Bank) with an interest in police and security sector reform.

In terms of rule of law, the three main requirements are to plan early to establish a truly independent investigative and adjudicative body, to start reform efforts early in the judiciary and to enlarge the specialist crime investigating agencies.

Anti-corruption initiatives with the National Army

As well as establishing Shafafiyat, ISAF put a major effort into supporting a range of initiatives within the Afghan National Army to limit corruption. These ranged from setting up an Inspector General system in all the Corps and at the MOD, meeting quarterly with the Minister to review all IG files, establishing a dedicated corruption prevention unit within the MOD, and inviting external observers into Procurement Tendering Boards. There continue to be major corruption issues, but the efforts clearly contribute to the continuing public perception that the corruption levels in the Afghan army are very low. The way in which this effort was directed is worth consideration in other country environments. There have been comparable efforts with the police, but to less effect. These ideas need to be considered by organisations such as the UN, UNDP and the World Bank in the context of Security Sector Reform efforts.

3. International civilian leadership

a. Civilian ownership of corruption issues within the mission

Unless policy makers take unambiguous ownership of addressing corruption issues from the beginning of an intervention, the chances of failure will increase substantially.

That ownership has to be in civil/political hands, in order to ensure proper alignment across both military and civilian functions. In Afghanistan, in the absence of such civilian leadership, it was positive that the military stepped into the breach with a military-led counter-corruption agency, but this solution did not command sufficient support from the policy-makers to get traction on serious corruption threats.

The task of specifying a better set of mechanisms for IC coordination on corruption surely has to lie with the principal international organisations: the UN - as the international organisation most likely to be at the centre of international support missions – the EU External Action Service, and the African Union.

Specialist corruption-prevention capacity for future interventions

An agency was set up for corruption-prevention in 2010 in Afghanistan by ISAF, as the international military realised that corruption problems exacerbated security problems and threatened the success of the mission. It suffered from being a military creation, rather than an agency across the whole international community, but was nonetheless a dramatic improvement on the previous lack of any unified focus. Such an agency (or similar capacity) should be an integral part of future international missions. More information on Shafafiyat can be found in Chapter X and at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/combined-joint-interagency-task-force-afghanistan/index.php>

b. A single, agreed policy line on corruption issues

An agreed policy needs to run across all chains of command of the assistance-giver - political, military and developmental. Bottom lines should be set that should not be crossed during the intervention.

c. A policy that is robust against sophisticated retaliation

The greatest tension in interventions is the idea that the IC is present at the invitation of the host nation, yet in reality elements of the host nation leadership are likely to be invested in corruption, patronage and criminal activity. Inevitably, measures by the IC to limit the diversion of funds or restrict patronage invites counter-measures.

Policy makers should prepare as far as possible for such responses, and ensure that counter-measures form part of the guidance and training.

“I would really foster the ability to identify the subversive campaigns of criminal networks, narcotics trafficking organisations and insurgencies”

Senior U.S. military officer, 24.10.2012

4. Prudent use of funds

a. Spend less

b. Cease using spending incentives that encourage corruption

c. No expenditure without an in-built audit

d. Coordination of aid projects between donors

These are well-known problems, but ones that seem to have defied solution over decades. Sums of money which vastly exceed a country's ability to absorb them will, inexorably, lead to the difference vanishing in corruption. The starting point for addressing these problems is the requirement for corruption threats and risks to be an integral part of the intervention mandate (See 1. above). Once in the mandate, policy makers can test all support and spending incentives against the requirement to limit or avoid corruption..

At the same time, a higher standard of accountability by IC funding agencies is overdue. We recommend that all the agencies involved, whether international or national, use existing international forums to develop a set of requirements for disbursement and verification that are more rigorous than most that exist today.

Specialist capacity to track corruption and fraud in contracting for the mission

After a public outcry against corruption in international contracts for logistics supply to Afghanistan, the U.S. set up an agency specifically tracking corruption and fraud in US contracting for Afghanistan. Called 'Task Force 2010', this agency had considerable success in both tracking problem contracts and in encouraging better behaviour by contractors more generally. We think such an agency (or at least the capacity built into the mission organisation) should be an integral part of future international missions.

5. Oversight and transparency

a. Strong independent oversight

The use of external monitors greatly increases the effectiveness of monitoring corruption. Experience from Afghanistan and elsewhere illustrates the diversity of forms of external oversight. This recommendation has already found partial expression in the good examples quoted in the text boxes in this section– strengthening the external oversight that is at least partially established by the large international or national organisations engaged. There is also a clear and well-established need to strengthen civil society and the national media.

A joint national-international, independent committee of experts to monitor and evaluate national progress on anti-corruption initiatives

The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (the 'MEC') is comprised of six members, three well-respected Afghans and three well-respected anti-corruption experts from the international community, working together with a full-time secretariat. They produce reports every six months reporting on progress across the full range of activities of the Afghan government. Originally set up as a corrective to the perceived failures of the High office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), it quickly gained authority as an independent and credible voice. More information on the MEC can be found in Chapter X and at <http://www.mec.af>

b. Transparency at donor level

More transparency surrounding the allocation and disbursement of funds and equipment should be required by policy makers. Currently the flow of funds is not clearly mapped, with donor countries using a multitude of bilateral and multilateral programmes and working through different government departments to channel funds to recipients. Accounting for how much is used is a significant challenge.

An independent internal monitoring body for international missions

U.S. legislation requires that a special Inspector General be established for each international mission. There was one for Iraq ('SIGIR') and one for Afghanistan, the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR. SIGAR got off to a poor start, but in due course became much more active in analysing waste and corruption involving U.S. funds. We believe that an independent investigating organisation like this should be part of all international missions, and become an integral part of the UN's oversight apparatus. More information on SIGAR can be found in Chapter 4 and at www.sigar.mil.

c. Transparency at the national level of all defence and security spending

Greater transparency in the defence and security sectors is an important element of reducing corruption risk in fragile environments. Ideally this should include publicly available and detailed defence and police budgets; an explicit, transparent, merit-based system of recruitment and promotion; full availability of personnel numbers and salary information; etc.

d. Information and feedback channels

Donors need to develop mechanisms to indicate if it is likely that assistance is being misused or diverted. Their own information-gathering channels and intelligence capabilities need to be alerted to watch for concerns and to have mechanisms to alert policy makers when they see cause for suspicion.

Next steps

We encourage all those involved in policy making in international interventions and technical assistance to consider how their own policies and processes align with the guidance from this framework. We welcome debate and discussion that will strengthen the framework.

Endnotes

- ¹ Philip Hammond, UK Secretary of State for Defence, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, 1 February 2014, session “The Post-Conflict Conundrum”
- ² New York Times, “Biden Offers Strong Support to Ukraine and Issues a Sharp Rebuke to Russia”, 22 April 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/world/europe/biden-ukraine.html?_r=0
- ³ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-security-governance-initiative>
- ⁴ <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>
- ⁵ Independent joint anti-corruption monitoring and evaluation committee, report of the public inquiry into the Kabul bank crisis, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 15, 2012; <http://mec.af/files/knpir-final.pdf>
- ⁶ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR2010062104628.html>
- ⁷ <http://www.sigar.mil>
- ⁸ <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FNLcorruptionchapterOccasionalPaperJuly30.pdf>
- ⁹ IWA June 2014 survey.
- ¹⁰ SIGAR quarterly report to the United States Congress, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf>
- ¹¹ Afghan National Budget: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/SY1390_Government_AFG_Budget.pdf
- ¹² Afghanistan GI report
- ¹³ SIGAR quarterly report to the United States Congress, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf>
- ¹⁴ ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat Archives’, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html>, accessed September 2014
- ¹⁵ International policy maker, 15.09.2014
- ¹⁶ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Group on Corruption and Security, Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security, June 2014, p1.
- ¹⁷ Afghan academic, 17.12.2013
- ¹⁸ Afghan academic, 04.02.2014
- ¹⁹ International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ²⁰ XX
- ²¹ XX
- ²² NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), ‘Counter- and Anti-Corruption. Theory and Practice from NATO Operations’, 2013, http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/jallc_report_corruption_releasable.pdf , accessed September 2014, para 20.
- ²³ International policy maker, 05.11.2013

- ²⁴ Afghan policy implementer, 06.12.2012
- ²⁵ International policy maker, 23.11.2012
- ²⁶ Resolution [48/208](#), December 1993; Resolution [50/88](#), February 1996; Rashid, 53-56; Security Council Resolution [1333](#) (2000); Security Council Resolution [1267](#) (1999).
- ²⁷ XX
- ²⁸ Afghan academic, 30.01.2014
- ²⁹ International military officer, 25.09.2012
- ³⁰ International military officer, 28.09.2012
- ³¹ International military officer, 28.09.2012
- ³² International policy implementer, 15.10.2012
- ³³ International policy implementer, 17.10.2012
- ³⁴ Rashid, 202-203; Modern Afghanistan, 242
- ³⁵ UNSC [Resolution 1510](#), 13 October 2003,
- ³⁶ International policy implementer, 27.09.2012
- ³⁷ International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ³⁸ Afghan policy implementer, 06.12.2012
- ³⁹ International academic, 31.08.2012
- ⁴⁰ Joshua Partlow, 'For General Petraeus, battling corruption in Afghanistan is a priority', *Washington Post*, 29 July 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/28/AR2010072805683.html>, accessed 24 September 2014.
- ⁴¹ International policy implementer, 15.10.2012
- ⁴² Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2012, <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/southasia/afghanistan/Documents/tokyo-declaration-and-mutual-accountability-framework.pdf>, accessed September 2014
- ⁴³ Mark Lowcock, 'A year on from the Tokyo conference on Afghanistan', 3 July 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mark-lowcock-a-year-on-from-the-tokyo-conference-on-afghanistan>, accessed September 2014.
- ⁴⁴ International academic, 14.09.2012
- ⁴⁵ http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail
- ⁴⁶ Afghan military contractor, 11.10.2012
- ⁴⁷ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁴⁸ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ⁴⁹ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ⁵⁰ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁵¹ Senior policy maker, 28.02.2013
- ⁵² International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ⁵³ International policy maker, 23.11.2012
- ⁵⁴ International policy implementer, 17.10.2012
- ⁵⁵ Senior military officer, 24.10.2014

- ⁵⁶ International policy implementer, 07.02.2013
- ⁵⁷ Afghan academic, 04.02.2014
- ⁵⁸ Afghan policy implementer, 08.11.2012
- ⁵⁹ International policy maker, 15.09.2014
- ⁶⁰ International policy maker, 17.10.2013
- ⁶¹ Afghan policy maker, 10.11.2012
- ⁶² International policy implementer, 06.09.2012
- ⁶³ International military officer, 28.09.2012
- ⁶⁴ International police advisor, 31.01.2013
- ⁶⁵ https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201110_RDS_Heidenkamp.pdf
- ⁶⁶ Senior military officer, 07.10.2014
- ⁶⁷ Senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ⁶⁸ The growing complexities of contemporary ..??
- ⁶⁹ International senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ⁷⁰ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ⁷¹ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁷² International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ⁷³ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ⁷⁴ International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ⁷⁵ International academic, 18.10.2012
- ⁷⁶ International policy implementer, 18.03.2013
- ⁷⁷ Afghan academic, 17.12.2013
- ⁷⁸ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012
- ⁷⁹ International policy maker, 23.11.2012
- ⁸⁰ International senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ⁸¹ International military officer, 21.03.2013
- ⁸² Afghan policy maker, 10.11.2012
- ⁸³ International military officer, 19.03.2013
- ⁸⁴ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ⁸⁵ International policy maker, 03.10.2014
- ⁸⁶ Afghan policy maker, 10.11.2012
- ⁸⁷ International policy maker, 15.09.2014
- ⁸⁸ International military officer, 25.09.2012
- ⁸⁹ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁹⁰ Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ⁹¹ Afghan policy implementer, 08.11.2012
- ⁹² International governance advisor, 05.09.2012

- ⁹³ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁹⁴ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ⁹⁵ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ⁹⁶ Afghan policy maker, 10.11.2012
- ⁹⁷ Senior military officer, 19.11.2012
- ⁹⁸ Senior policy maker, 28.02.2013
- ⁹⁹ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹⁰⁰ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹⁰¹ Afghan policy implementer, 17.12.2013
- ¹⁰² International policy maker, 03.10.2012
- ¹⁰³ Academic and senior analyst, 31.08.2012
- ¹⁰⁴ Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ¹⁰⁵ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ¹⁰⁶ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ¹⁰⁷ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ¹⁰⁸ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012
- ¹⁰⁹ T. Sullivan and C Forsberg, Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict
http://www.intelros.ru/pdf/Prism/2014_4_4/10.pdf
- ¹¹⁰ Senior military officer, 24.10.2014
- ¹¹¹ International journalist and policy maker, 19.12.2013
- ¹¹² International journalist and policy maker, 19.12.2013
- ¹¹³ Senior policy maker, 28.02.2013
- ¹¹⁴ International policy maker, 09.12.2012
- ¹¹⁵ Afghan academic, 17.12.2013
- ¹¹⁶ International policy implementer, 12.09.2012
- ¹¹⁷ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012.
- ¹¹⁸ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ¹¹⁹ International police officer, 06.02.2013
- ¹²⁰ Afghan policy implementer, 06.12.2012
- ¹²¹ Afghan academic, 30.01.2014
- ¹²² International military officer, 19.03.2013
- ¹²³ International policy maker, 09.12.2012
- ¹²⁴ International military officer, 25.09.2012
- ¹²⁵ International military officer, 15.05.2008
- ¹²⁶ International policy maker, 15.09.2014
- ¹²⁷ International policy maker, 05.11.2013

- ¹²⁸ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹²⁹ International policy implementer, 17.10.2012
- ¹³⁰ International policy implementer, 18.03.2013
- ¹³¹ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012
- ¹³² International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ¹³³ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹³⁴ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ¹³⁵ Senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ¹³⁶ International policy maker, 23.11.2012
- ¹³⁷ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ¹³⁸ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹³⁹ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ¹⁴⁰ Senior military officer, 19.11.2012
- ¹⁴¹ Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ¹⁴² International academic, 19.10.2016
- ¹⁴³ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ¹⁴⁴ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹⁴⁵ International policy implementer, 06.09.2012
- ¹⁴⁶ Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ¹⁴⁷ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ¹⁴⁸ International policy maker, 03.10.2012
- ¹⁴⁹ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ¹⁵⁰ International policy maker, 03.10.2012
- ¹⁵¹ International lecturer and academic, 11.09.2012
- ¹⁵² International academic, 16.10.2012
- ¹⁵³ International governance advisor, 05.09.2012
- ¹⁵⁴ International policy maker, 02.04.2013
- ¹⁵⁵ International policy implementer, 12.09.2012
- ¹⁵⁶ Senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ¹⁵⁷ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ¹⁵⁸ Academic and senior analyst, 31.08.2012
- ¹⁵⁹ Senior military advisor, 30.01.2013
- ¹⁶⁰ International policy implementer, 18.03.2013
- ¹⁶¹ Senior international policy maker, 05.04.2013
- ¹⁶² International police officer, 06.02.2013
- ¹⁶³ International policy maker, 20.09.2012
- ¹⁶⁴ Afghan policy maker, 10.11.2012

- ¹⁶⁵ International governance advisor, 05.09.2012
- ¹⁶⁶ Senior policy maker, 28.02.2013
- ¹⁶⁷ International police advisor, 31.01.2013
- ¹⁶⁸ International policy maker, 15.09.2014
- ¹⁶⁹ International policy maker, 05.11.2013
- ¹⁷⁰ International military officer, 28.09.2012
- ¹⁷¹ Senior military officer, 07.10.2014
- ¹⁷² International lecturer and academic, 11.09.2012
- ¹⁷³ International academic, 14.09.2012
- ¹⁷⁴ Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ¹⁷⁵ International academic, 14.09.2012
- ¹⁷⁶ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ¹⁷⁷ International military officer, 25.09.2012
- ¹⁷⁸ Senior military officer, 24.10.2014
- ¹⁷⁹ International academic, 14.09.2012
- ¹⁸⁰ International academic, 14.09.2012
- ¹⁸¹ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012
- ¹⁸² Senior military officer, 08.11.2013
- ¹⁸³ Afghan academic, 04.02.2014
- ¹⁸⁴ Senior military officer, 19.11.2012
- ¹⁸⁵ Senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ¹⁸⁶ Afghan academic, 04.02.2014
- ¹⁸⁷ Senior researcher and academic, 12.09.2013
- ¹⁸⁸ International policy implementer, 17.10.2012
- ¹⁸⁹ International police advisor, 22.02.2013
- ¹⁹⁰ International policy implementer, 06.09.2012
- ¹⁹¹ International policy maker, 23.11.2012
- ¹⁹² International police officer, 06.02.2013
- ¹⁹³ International policy implementer, 07.02.2013
- ¹⁹⁴ International police advisor, 22.02.2013
- ¹⁹⁵ International police advisor, 31.01.2013
- ¹⁹⁶ International policy implementer, 18.03.2013
- ¹⁹⁷ International police advisor, 23.10.2012
- ¹⁹⁸ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ¹⁹⁹ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ²⁰⁰ International police officer, 06.02.2013
- ²⁰¹ International policy maker, 20.09.2012

- ²⁰² International military officer, 25.09.2012
- ²⁰³ International policy maker, 20.09.2012
- ²⁰⁴ Afghan academic, 17.12.2013
- ²⁰⁵ International policy maker, 03.10.2014
- ²⁰⁶ International policy maker, 12.11.2013
- ²⁰⁷ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012
- ²⁰⁸ International policy implementer, 06.09.2012
- ²⁰⁹ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ²¹⁰ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ²¹¹ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ²¹² International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ²¹³ International policy maker, 25.09.2013
- ²¹⁴ Afghan academic, 04.02.2014
- ²¹⁵ International senior policy maker, 12.12.2012
- ²¹⁶ "Corruption: the unrecognised threat to international security". Working group on corruption and security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2014
- ²¹⁷ International policy maker, 07.12.2012
- ²¹⁸ Bertram Spector, President of the Center for Negotiation Analysis, "Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption: Challenges for Post-Conflict Societies", 2011
- ²¹⁹ "Corruption and Peacekeeping" TI-DSP <http://ti-defence.org/publications/20-category-publications/publications-dsp/128-dsp-pubs-corruption-pk.html>, 2013
- ²²⁰ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Group on Corruption and Security, Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security, June 2014
- ²²¹ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ²²² http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_93045.htm
- ²²³ http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf
- ²²⁴ JALLC reference, JCOA reference
- ²²⁵ International policy maker, 29.04.2013
- ²²⁶ Senior military officer, 24.10.2012

Addressing corruption threats in international interventions

Author: Mark Pyman

Contributors: Sir Ian Andrews, Sir Stewart Eldon, Drago Kos, Yama Torabi, James Black, James Cohen, Jon Davies, Marine Durand, Abdullah Faqiri, Ida Hockerfelt, Marie Huber, Mohammed Isakzadeh, Emily Knowles, Saad Mustafa, Stefanie Nijssen, Victoria Parr, Ben Webster

Editor: Emily Knowles

Design: SVIDesign, Ivo Jongejan

This report has been printed on FSC certified paper.

ISBN number: XXX-X-XXXXXXX-X-X

Transparency International UK
32-36 Loman Street
London SE1 0EH
United Kingdom

© Transparency International UK.
All rights reserved.
First published in January 2014.

Reproduction in whole or in parts is permitted, providing that full credit is given to Transparency International UK (TI-UK) and provided that any such reproduction, whether in whole or in parts, is not sold or incorporated in works that are sold.

Effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. Nevertheless, Transparency International UK cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.

Thanks

TI-DSP would like to thank the UK Department for International Development (DfID) for their generous support.

**Transparency International UK's
Defence and Security Programme
works to reduce corruption in
defence and security worldwide.**

**We engage with governments,
armed forces, security forces,
defence companies, civil society,
and others to advance this goal.**

**We provide new tools, practical
reforms, benchmarks, and
research to enable change.**

www.ti-defence.org